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Abstract
The world is shifting from a unipolar system following the end of the Cold War to
a multipolar system that is ushered in by “the rise of the rest.” This change in the global
structure has led some analysts to predict an increase in nuclear weapons proliferation
caused by increased uncertainty and a decrease in alliances and security assurances.
Nuclear proliferation, however, will not increase because these types of predictions are
founded upon realist assumptions that inaccurately predict the characteristics of the
emerging multipolar system as well as inaccurately understanding calculations of states
with regard to nuclear weapons programs. I review a variety of literature concerning
international politics theory and nuclear weapons forming a theoretical framework and
use Iran and Turkey as case studies to test my hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The study of motivations to pursue nuclear weapons is particularly difficult given
the small amount of empirical evidence that is available. Furthermore, as theories of
international relations evolve and change over the years, so too do the theories
concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Over the last 65 years or so,
only a relatively small number of states have actually gone the distance in developing
nuclear weapons despite the great number of forecasts and predictions that nuclear
weapons would spread around the world.
An overwhelming majority of evidence concerning the spread of nuclear weapons
comes from the Cold War era—a time when the world was nearly split in half between
East and West. Most states around the world, although exceptions certainly existed,
either aligned themselves with the United States or the Soviet Union. Many of the
theories of the proliferation of nuclear weapons still assume a Cold War environment, but
the world has changed. The international system is no longer bipolar. States that were
once constrained by the influence of the United Sates or Soviet Union now have much
more freedom to pursue their own policies. Furthermore, in the age of globalization,
states are becoming richer and can attain technology once reserved only for the richest
and most powerful nations. States around the world are now challenging the power and
influence of the United States, which was not possible just a few decades ago during the
Cold War. A new international system is emerging.
1

A key neo-realist assumption is that instability increases in multipolar system,
thus the chance of war also increases. This assumption is reflected in many predictions
of nuclear proliferation in the coming years. Francis J. Gavin explains that a wide variety
of public figures and politicians, from President Obama and Senator John McCain to
even Thomas Schelling, have recently proclaimed that nuclear proliferation is and will be
America’s greatest security challenge in the future.1 Indeed, the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) reflects these sentiments. Although the NPR does not refer to the
emerging system, or a multipolar system explicitly, it explains that the United States is
shifting its focus to nuclear proliferation and “adapting to a changed security
environment.”2 The NPR reflects the changes in the global system that I will be
addressing here, including changes in security assurances and reduced constraint on states
in the international system, but fails to address other aspects of the emerging international
system that will have a large impact on proliferation in the future. It explains, “A failure
of reassurance could lead to a decision by one or more non-nuclear states to seek nuclear
deterrents of their own, an outcome which could contribute to an unraveling of the NPT
regime and to a greater likelihood of nuclear weapon use.”3

1

Francis J. Gavin, "Same as it Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold
War," International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): pp. 7-8.
2

"Nuclear Posture Review Report." U.S. Department of Defense, p. 5.
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Ibid.,p. 3.
2

A National Intelligence Council report further confirms the belief that nuclear
weapons will spread in the future, particularly in reaction to perceived Iranian capacity to
produce nuclear weapons.4 Further, the report claims:
Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar
or unipolar ones….[T]he next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught
with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments,
and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th
century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.5
Among the risks the NIC outlines is an increase in nuclear proliferation, particularly in
the Middle East.6
Does this mean that more and more states will seek nuclear weapons in order to
ensure security in this type of environment? If we were to believe basic neo-realist
assumptions, the answer would be yes. In fact, it was my intention to demonstrate this at
the outset of this study; however, my assumption was based on only a narrow
understanding of the emerging international system, and a monocausal explanation of
nuclear calculations based on the security environment of states.
It is not my goal to determine a unified theory of proliferation, nor is it my goal to
predict which states will and will not pursue nuclear weapons in the future. Instead, it is
my goal to counter the theories predicting widespread proliferation in the future caused
by a multipolar system. The world will be a very different place than it was during the
Cold War, and nuclear weapons research should reflect these changes.

4

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2008), p. 62.
5

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, p. vi.

6

Ibid., p. 61.
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Some of the largest changes in the emerging system have nothing to do with the
balance of power as traditionally understood. Instead, major themes in the future will
include economic power, globalization, and a larger emphasis on norms and ideas.
Although states will be less constrained in the multipolar system than under the previous
unipolar and bipolar systems, the conditions of the emerging system will influence states
not to pursue nuclear weapons. All too often, once analysts begin to consider what forces
are pushing a state towards proliferation, they forget to look at the degree to which those
factors are actually pushing and which factors are pushing back.
Problems with Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation
There is certainly no shortage of literature concerning the future of nuclear
weapons. Despite such a vast literature, it is difficult to find any two forecasts or theories
that agree with one another. Qualitative forecasts and theories primarily fall into two
categories—realist and constructivist accounts. With no surprise, realist accounts
primarily focus on external security threats, while constructivists emphasize interests,
ideas, and identities of states.
As mentioned above, many look exclusively at the threats a state faces in order to
determine whether or not it is at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons. Scott D. Sagan warns
against the dangers of believing only one model can explain a state’s decision to go
nuclear. Sagan explains that “a near consensus that the answer is obvious” exists, and
many policymakers and scholars are complacent in believing that the decision to go
nuclear is a direct reaction to military threats to a state’s security.7 Sagan admits that
7

Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a
Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): p. 54.
4

many, if not most, cases of proliferation, can be explained with the classic security
model, but “multi-causality, rather than measurement error, lies at the heart of the nuclear
proliferation problem.”8
Even among forecasts with similar theories, vast differences in methodology
exist. Moeed Yusuf of the Brookings institution demonstrates the history of nuclear
forecasts and believes it a “paradox” that such a large number of forecasts of nuclear
weapons proliferation have incorrectly predicted future proliferation.9 Yusuf explains that
the failure is due to flaws in methodology10 and outlines 6 “broad lessons” that can be
learned from past forecasting failures:

8

1.

Consistent misjudgments regarding the extent of nuclear proliferation

2.

While all the countries that did eventually develop nuclear weapons were
on the lists of suspect states, the estimations misjudged when these
countries would go nuclear.

3.

The pace of proliferation has been consistently slower than has been
anticipated by most experts due to a combination of overwhelming
alarmism, the intent of threshold states, and many incentives to abstain
from weapons development.

4.

The debate concerning the size of future arsenals of the various nuclear
powers produced mixed results.

5.

The tone of predictive studies was not always consistent with
contemporaneous events.

6.

There is evidence that over the long-term, external assistance was a major
factor in proliferation.11

Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 86.

9

Moeed Yusuf, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear
Weapons,” Brookings Institution (2009): p. 4.
10

Ibid., p. 4.

11

Ibid., p. 4-5.
5

This study agrees with the above analysis and will focus, not on predicting how
many states will pursue nuclear weapons in the future, but rather to what degree the
international system plays in a state’s nuclear calculus. For my purposes, lessons 3, 5,
and 6 a particularly useful. Alarmism has not gone away, and is seen in many recent
articles claiming that a nuclear cascade is imminent in the Middle East.
Furthermore, the main focus of my analysis is consistent with lesson 5. The
contemporaneous events of the emerging international system must be considered when
assessing the drivers of nuclear proliferation. It is not sufficient to simply examine the
shifting balance of power, which will be addressed in the following chapter establishing
the theoretical framework of this study. Lastly, lesson 6 is also important. External
assistance is likely to be affected by the multipolar system of the near future, which will
in turn make it more difficult for states to pursue nuclear weapons.
Like Sagan and Yusuf, Sonali Singh, and Christopher R. Way, have similar
reservations of many forecasts. “Many studies,” they argue, “implicitly rely on
monocausal logics of inference, comparing competing explanations, as if looking for the
‘magic bullet’ that will account for all proliferation.”12 Singh and Way bring up an
important point: no single variable exists that determines whether or not a state will
proliferate. Further, Sing and Way explain another problem with many forecasts. Many
forecasts determine proliferation in an all-or-nothing fashion where possession of a
weapon is the only affirmative case of proliferation.13 Instead, the authors argue,
12

Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A
Quantitative Test,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, no. 6 (2004): p. 861.
13

Ibid.
6

proliferation should be viewed as a continuum with four stages: no noticeable interest in
nuclear weapons, serious exploration of the weapons option, launch of a weapons
program, and acquisition of nuclear weapons.14 For my purposes, proliferation will refer
to the testing of a nuclear bomb. As we have seen in the past, some states that have
pursued nuclear weapons, or had the political will to pursue nuclear weapons, were either
unable to do so or changed course. I have chosen to use the test of a weapon as the
dependent variable, because the international system can and will intervene in different
ways with regard to the several variables it takes to build a nuclear weapon.
Furthermore, it is possible for states to construct a bomb, or attain a latent capability, that
cannot be detected. Therefore, it is not possible to use the construction of a bomb as the
dependent variable. Since I have included capacity as one of my independent variables,
the international system could still intervene in important ways preventing a state from
attaining nuclear weapons.

Methodology
What makes this study different is its focus on the how the changing international
system will affect nuclear aspirations and capabilities while taking a multi-causal
approach. I examine a variety of variables in order to determine to what extent the
emerging multipolar system will influence calculations concerning nuclear weapons in
the future. In the next chapter, I will examine which parts of the global system are
changing, how those factors might shape states’ nuclear calculations, as well as those
14

Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation,” p.
861.
7

factors that may not be affected by the international system. Next, I examine the various
theories with regard to nuclear proliferation and put them in context with the changing
international system. Finally, I test this theory with two case studies: Iran and Turkey.

Variables
Through an examination of the literature concerning nuclear weapons
proliferation, I have constructed three causal diagrams to account for the theories; I will
examine the theories in the next chapter. Two main variables exist: willingness and
capacity. Each of these main variables is driven by a variety of sub-variables. Below I
will go into detail of the sub-variables that I will be using for this study. First, however,
willingness and capacity should be further explained. Capacity and willingness
essentially correspond to the supply and demand sides of proliferation decisions. Both
must be looked at with equal importance.
Willingness refers to whether or not a state wants to pursue nuclear weapons. In
the past, this variable was boiled down to the most simplistic examination of security
concerns, but, as history has demonstrated, the theory has evolved to include a variety of
other factors that go far beyond security concerns. The causal diagram below
demonstrates the main variables I will be using to determine willingness of a state to
pursue nuclear weapons. The willingness variable is further broken down into ideational
and material factors.

8

Figure 1

The ideational factors are as indicated in the diagram above: identity, norms, and
prestige. The material factors are a combination of economic and security interests, as
well as a state’s capacity to pursue nuclear weapons (to be discussed below).
Even though, as I argued above, many analysts have focused too heavily on
security interests as a driver of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it still plays an
important role. Nuclear weapons can mitigate security concerns through their deterrent
capabilities. Another important aspect of the security environment of a state is the
security assurances it may receive from other states. If a state lies under the nuclear
umbrella of another state, like the United States, it may be less likely to obtain its own
nuclear deterrent. Instead, a state may be more likely to choose to focus its time and
energy on other concerns, like developing the domestic economy.
This brings me to my next variable: economic interests, a variable that will play a
larger role in the emerging international system as globalization increases and states
become more integrated economically. More specifically, it is important to analyze a
country’s preferred method of economic development. An outward looking state, one
that seeks economic opportunities outside of its own borders will be less likely to pursue
9

nuclear weapons. On the other hand, an inward looking state, one that focuses its
economy inside its own borders, does not rely on the economic partnerships and is more
at risk to pursue nuclear weapons. This leads me to the other variable regarding
economic interests: the vulnerability of a state to external economic pressure. One of the
most common ways the international community attempts to deal with a state it believes
is pursuing nuclear weapons is through the placement of sanctions. Weak states cannot
stand up to sanctions like stronger states can. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that simply because a state is vulnerable to external economic pressure, does not mean
that it will cease to pursue nuclear weapons. Further, states with outward looking models
of economic development rely on relationships with other states. If these relationships
were to be severed, the states vital economic interests would be at risk, and states may
find that it is not worth losing its economic interests by seeking nuclear weapons. Some
states may conclude, either due to security threats or ideology, that nuclear weapons are
worth the expense.
In addition to security concerns and economic interests, ideational factors must
also be taken into account. This is a particularly difficult driver to explain due to the
large number of ideational factors that can be at play in different countries. Thus, I have
broken down ideational factors into a few basic components: norms, identities, and
prestige. Norms are playing a more and more important role in proliferation calculations
due to the ever-growing number of treaties, agreements, and movements that seek to
protect the world from growing nuclear stockpiles. It is possible that states will choose
not to pursue nuclear weapons because of the belief that doing so would be harmful for
the world. A state’s adherence to norms can be difficult to determine, because, as we
10

have seen in the past, signatories of the NPT often pursue nuclear weapons covertly.
Thus, it is also important to look at other indicators like treaties concerning chemical or
biological weapons or testing or public statements by state leadership. Also, breaking
norms could result in a loss of prestige, or political and economic backlash leading to
isolation in the international community.
Identities of a state also play an important role in assessing the risk of a state
pursuing nuclear weapons. In this case, identity can refer to a lot of things. But most
importantly, it refers to whether a state’s ethical and moral traditions allow for nuclear
weapons production. Religion can play a large role, as many religious principals, both
Eastern and Western, condemn not only the use of nuclear weapons, but the production of
them as well. In other states, leaders may simply be ideologically opposed to the idea of
nuclear weapons. Still, in other states, the personality of the state’s leadership is
important in determining proliferation. This will be explained in detail in the theory
section.
Finally, prestige is an important factor to consider when calculating a state’s
motivation to pursue nuclear weapons. In many cases, a state may feel that the only way
to get the prestige it feels it deserves is through the production of nuclear weapons.
Prestige can come in a few different forms. First, a state may feel that simply the
possession of nuclear weapons will persuade the international community to take it more
seriously. Also, a state may find prestige in the scientific and technological achievements
that come with nuclear weapons. Conversely, states can choose not to pursue nuclear
weapons because of prestige. In this regard, prestige can be closely related to norms and

11

identity. In order to examine whether or not prestige is at play in a given state, I will look
at the strategic culture of states as well as public statements by their leadership.
In addition to examining the willingness of states to pursue nuclear weapons, we
must also consider a state’s capacity to do so—the final material variable. Capacity is the
last material variable examined in this study. Even if a state were to be fully committed
to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, it will not pursue nuclear weapons if it lacks the
ability to do so. I have broken capacity down into four different variables: access to
materials, economic capacity, know-how, and technical capacity/technology.

Figure 2

Access to materials is incredibly important to any budding nuclear weapons
program. The transfer and sale of uranium is highly regulated, and can only be mined in
a relatively small number of countries. If a country is not able to obtain uranium, even if
it mastered the ability to enrich it to weaponization levels, it would not be able create the
fissile material needed for a weapons program.
Economic capacity is also an important factor determining whether or not a state
will pursue nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons programs are expensive, and few
countries can afford one. Some countries divert funds to nuclear weapons programs at

12

the expense of the well being of their population; simply because a state has limited funds
does not mean that it will not go to great lengths to pay for nuclear weapons programs.
Know-how is also an important variable in capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
It takes special knowledge and highly educated engineers to not only enrich uranium, but
also to turn HEU into workable and efficient bombs. Furthermore, a country also needs
to produce delivery methods, which in most cases is missiles. Many countries lack a base
of scientists and engineers capable of producing a robust nuclear weapons program. It
should be noted, however, that know-how is becoming easier to come by. Not only is
know-how bought and sold on the black market, much of the knowledge with regard to
building bombs is becoming more and more accessible, which makes this driver one of
the easier capacity hurdles to overcome. As I will demonstrate below, however, this kind
of knowledge is not enough to create nuclear weapons. A much more specialized
knowledge is required that is not necessarily more widely available because of
globalization.
It is only when both willingness and capacity align will a state pursue nuclear
weapons. As demonstrated in each of the causal diagrams above, many variables exist
which will affect a state’s willingness and capacity to pursue nuclear weapons.

Figure 3

13

Case Studies
The idea of a nuclear cascade in the Middle East, given the continued pursuit of
nuclear weapons by Iran, has grown so popular, that many simply take it as fact. Such a
focus on this idea, and how it could happen, has distracted analysts from more realistic
understandings of the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East by focusing too
heavily on narrow-minded analyses based solely on realist interpretations of the security
environment. When one examines the security environment more closely, however,
along with the characteristics of the state’s leadership, the political economy, as well as
the technological and economic capacity, the prospect of a nuclear cascade in the Middle
East no longer seems inevitable. In fact, even if a state should choose to pursue nuclear
weapons, the international community has at its disposal a variety of levers for
intervention. The immense amount of resources and time it takes to develop a nuclear
weapons program allows the international community plenty of opportunity to keep a
state from proliferating should it choose that path. To examine this hypothesis, I will
focus on Turkey and Iran—two states believed by many to be at high risk of proliferation,
especially if Iran continues to pursue the bomb. I will demonstrate using the above four
drivers that both Iran and Turkey may have a larger incentive not to pursue nuclear
weapons.
Turkey
Some may see Turkey as an interesting choice in testing my hypothesis, but my
choice to include Turkey was made after careful examination. Many analysts claim that
Turkey is at high risk of proliferation because of a combination of variables. First, many
analysts claim that Turkey will not tolerate a nuclear armed Iran, and will pursue its own
14

nuclear capability should Turkish leaders perceive that Tehran maintain its pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Second, many analysts (correctly) observe that Turkey’s relationship
with NATO is deteriorating quickly. This viewpoint, though shared by many, is
characterized by Peter Brookes who claims that Ankara is already considering its nuclear
options.15
Iran
I have chosen to use Iran as my first case study because it demonstrates the most
difficult test of my hypothesis, especially since it has gone to great lengths to defy the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to its enrichment projects, but
some clarification is necessary. First, it should be noted that Iran began its “modest
nuclear programme” in the 1960s under rule of the Shah. At this time, explains Emanuele
Ottolenghi, author of Iran: The Looming Crisis, prestige was a strong motivating factor
for nuclear research and nuclear weapons proliferation.16 Iran’s current efforts to enrich
uranium must be understood in this context, for enrichment began far before the
multipolar system began to emerge.

15

Peter Brookes, “Post Iran Proliferation Cascade,” The Journal of International Security
Affairs 19 (2010): p. 11.
16

Emanuele Ottolenghi, Iran: The Looming Crisis (New York: Profile Books, 2009): pp.
22-23.
15

CHAPTER 2 THEORY

As mentioned in the introduction, the National Intelligence Council is predicting,
“Over the next 15-20 years, reactions to the decisions Iran makes about its nuclear
program could cause a number of regional states to intensify these efforts and consider
actively pursuing nuclear weapons.”17 The report continues, “…[E]ven an Iranian
capacity to develop nuclear weapons might prompt regional responses that could be
destabilizing.”18 The report does not predict, however, that nuclear proliferation is
inevitable, even in Iran. Tehran, claims the NIC, may choose to forgo weaponization
over “technological impediments” or the desire to integrate its economy with that of the
international system.19 The report glances quickly over this prospect, however, and
sensationally predicts that the Middle East will become “Potentially More Dangerous
than the Cold War,”20 despite the fact that the NIC lists an arms race in the Middle East
as one of its Key Uncertainties.21

17

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, p. 61.

18

Ibid., p. 62.

19

Ibid., p. 61.

20

Ibid., p. 62.

21

Ibid., p. v.
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Why would the NIC predict such a pessimistic fate for the Middle East despite all
that is known about the inaccuracies of nuclear weapons forecasts as demonstrated in the
introduction of this study? The answer is simple. Despite hedging that a multi-state arms
race in the Middle East is not inevitable, they fall victim to traditional realist theories that
have been proven incomplete. The NIC report focuses particularly on the Middle East,
but analysts have been predicting that other states are at risk of proliferation as well, for
example Japan, South Korea, and even Brazil just to name a few. The goal of this thesis
is not specifically to counter the claims of the NIC in Global Trends 2025, but rather to
explore the actual effects of the changes of the international system on nuclear weapons
proliferation around the world. This chapter will examine the historic assumptions of
changes in the international system (particularly multipolar systems) followed by
predictions of the emerging multipolar international system.

Neo Realist Assumptions
The NIC report mentioned above demonstrates, “Historically, emerging
multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones,”22 a
traditional neorealist expectation as explained by Jack Donnelly.23 Hans Morgenthau,
one of the founders of contemporary realism, best explains this assumption and explains
that multipolar systems increase uncertainty, and thus increase caution.24 Also, in
22

National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, p. vi.

23

Jack Donnelly, "Realism." in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scot Burchill and
Andrew Linklater (New York: Pelgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 40.
24

Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th Edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1973), p. 121.
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multipolar systems, Morgenthau claims, even small states can make a big impact.25 This
is likely to be the case in the emerging system, as we already see smaller states like
Pakistan or Yemen playing a major role in international security, even if in a different
capacity than Morgenthau would have assessed. In a system in which states cannot rely
on allies, it is easy to understand why smaller states vulnerable to another state’s nuclear
arsenal will attempt to close a security gap with a nuclear arsenal of their own.
More recently, John Mearsheimer has emphasized the uncertainty and dangers of
multipolar systems complementing the work of Morgenthau demonstrated above.
Mearsheimer bluntly proclaims, “War is more likely in multipolarity than bipolarity….”26
He lists three reasons why, which deserve listing here. First, Mearsheimer argues, “There
are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a
multipolar system.”27 This is one reason many analysts believe that states will choose
nuclear weapons in order to ensure their security in an environment where war is more
likely. Second, Mearsheimer argues, “Imbalances of power are more commonplace in a
multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a
war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely.28 Again, in such an
environment, states should have an incentive to pursue nuclear weapons in order to
balance against these great powers, which are now more likely to wage war. Finally,

25

Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 121.

26

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 2001), p. 338.
27

Ibid.

28

Ibid., p. 338.
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Mearsheimer’s third argument explains, “The potential for miscalculations is greater in
multipolarity: States might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another
state when, in fact, they do not.”29 Again, this argument emphasizes the unpredictability
of the multipolar systems.
The above-assumed characteristics of multipolar systems have led many nuclear
forecasters to predict widespread proliferation. In fact, Mearsheimer made this claim
himself in a famously contested article, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after
the Cold War.” In predicting a multipolar Europe after the end of the Cold War,
Mearsheimer infamously predicts that nuclear weapons will also spread across the
continent, particularly to Germany and the “minor powers of Eastern Europe.” 30
An interesting note with regard to uncertainty is that risk also becomes more
uncertain, and thus, states take as little risk as possible.31 Scott Sagan similarly argues
that balance of power politics and the security dilemma actually deters proliferation in
many cases, thus making the world safer. “Restrained policies that appear to some
scholars to be the result of ethical considerations,” Sagan argues, “are often actually the
calculated pursuit of long-term national security interests.” He continues, “This is the
case when the nonuse of such weapons is due to a fear that an adversary would take your
military action as a precedent or excuse to do something that you do not want to see

29

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 338.

30

John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,"
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): p. 36.
31

Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 342.
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happen in the future.”32 This means that, for example, if Turkey attempts to counter the
nuclear aspirations of Iran, it could push Iran over the proverbial tipping point in order to
balance the intentions of Turkey. Thus, Turkey has only created the very undesirable
outcome it was looking to avoid in the first place.
Avoidance of risk, however, does not determine whether a state will pursue
nuclear weapons or not. A state could be attempting to avoid risk of becoming
vulnerable to a state with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, proliferation can be risky
in itself. States can be subject to harsh sanctions, isolation from the international
community, and even military intervention. For some states, they are already isolated,
and are not in a position in which sanctions are particularly harmful (or they do not care
about sanctions for one reason or another). Thus, uncertainty is not decisive in tipping a
state one way or the other, but can instead help the analyst determine which would be
more risky for a particular state.
With regard to nuclear weapons, Kenneth Waltz has spent much time and effort
exploring the characteristics of polarity in the international system, and two of his ideas
are particularly important to examine in this study, as they echo the arguments of
Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, which predict that nuclear weapons proliferation will
increase in the multipolar future. The first is that states cannot be certain of other states’
actions.33 Also, states’ relative capabilities will change in unforeseen ways in the
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future.34 Thus, states are “unwilling to make any move that results in any deterioration of
their existing position,”35 and states will most likely conclude that nuclear weapons will
mitigate the uncertainty and vulnerability experienced under multipolarity and maintain
their positions within the system.
Indeed, the theory seems to demonstrate that multipolarity will lead to a less
predictable and less stable security environment for a variety of states, even if states
calculate they are better off not making efforts to close capability gaps as explained by
Sagan or receive security assurances from more powerful states. Just as Mearsheimer got
it wrong in 1988, analysts predicting nuclear cascade have gotten it wrong this time by
examining the theory in a vacuum and not considering other aspects of the emerging
system. According to the literature to be reviewed below, some aspects will stay the
same, such as international organizations, international agreements, and norms. Indeed,
no enforcement mechanism is strong enough to keep states from proliferating, as we have
seen before, but the factors just mentioned will still play a strong role, as will security
assurances. Furthermore, the NIC has gotten it wrong by extrapolating significant shifts
in economic balance of power to the military realm.
Security assurances can mitigate uncertainty. As Morgenthau explains, states will
continue to prefer to work with allies, but that states cannot be certain allies will stay “on
side.”36 Many observers are predicting an end of a few security assurances that have
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traditionally kept states under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, particularly with
regard to Turkey. This will be elaborated upon below.
Richard Haass explains how the emerging system will reflect this theory,
“[N]onpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a
country….”37 Haass claims that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is a result of this. He
explains:
Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another
meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon,
Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many
sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports.
And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather,
Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or
block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets
nonpolarity.38
With the exception of Haass, the claims by the theorists examined above that
dominate the field were formed before anyone could decide, or even hope to foresee,
what the future international system will look like. Unlike Waltz and Mearsheimer (at
the time), and especially Morgenthau, we now have a clearer picture of the emerging
international system.
The Emerging System Will Defy Realist Assumptions
Analysts hoping to predict the extent of future nuclear weapons acquisition should
not rely too heavily on the above assumptions as too many have already done. To clarify,
it is not my intention to refute the above realist claims. Rather, I intend to demonstrate

37

Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What will Follow U.S. Dominance."
Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008): p. 5.
38

Ibid.
22

that the above claims are not sufficient in explaining nuclear weapons decisions under the
characteristics of the emerging intentional system, which includes the addition of other
material factors (economic concerns and capacity) as well as ideational factors. As Jack
Donnelly explains, the expectations of structural realism are not determinant factors,
merely exogenous pressures that push states in one way or another.39 Additionally,
sometimes, or perhaps always, other forces are more important.40 Kenneth Waltz has
even made this argument himself. He explains:
A neorealist theory of international politics explains how external forces shape
states’ behavior, but says nothing about the effects of internal forces. Under most
circumstances, a theory of international politics is not sufficient, and cannot be
made sufficient, for the explanation of foreign policy. An international political
theory can explain states’ behavior only when external pressures dominate the
internal disposition of states, which seldom happens. When they do not, a theory
of international politics needs help.41
The question remains, the question this paper will answer, “do these exogenous
factors outweigh the endogenous factors?” Furthermore, “are there additional external
factors in addition to shifting balances of power?” Therefore, the following review of
literature will examine the characteristics of the emerging system and determine what
forces are at play while also addressing main themes of emerging theories of nuclear
weapons proliferation.
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Characteristics of The Emerging Multipolar System
The world is moving away from the multipolar system that emerged after the end
of the Cold War, this much is clear. What is not clear, however, is what kind of system is
emerging. Commentators agree that the emerging international system differs from
previous multipolar systems, but not all agree that the future will indeed be multipolar.
Some analysts predict various systems such as an interpolar system, and even a nonpolar
system. Even among analysts that are arguing that the emerging system is multipolar,
they do not necessarily agree on the characteristics of the emerging system. I do not
expect to definitively settle the issue of what the emerging system will look like;
however, as I will demonstrate, each of these hypotheses has common characteristics that
inform whether or not states will wish to seek nuclear weapons under the emerging
international system. The following section will outline a few different theories and
hypotheses. Some major themes of the emerging international system include: stability,
economic interdependence, and a reliance on ethics and norms. I will examine the
emerging system in terms of the variables I explained in the introduction.

Security Environment
As explained above, realists would assume that the changing security
environment of the emerging system will lead to an increase in proliferation. The
security environment of a state remains an important variable to address, even in the
emerging international system. As Scott Sagan explains, “…[S]tates build nuclear
weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear
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threats.”42 Likewise, Joseph Cirincione argues “The national security model remains the
leading explanation for nuclear proliferation and is based in the long-standing
international relations theory of realism.”43 Thus, Cirincione concludes,
Nuclear weapons, from this perspective, are the ultimate security guarantor….
When a state faces an acute threat to its security such as a potential adversary
developing nuclear weapons, then that state will almost certainly have to match
that capability or risk its very existence.44
Security assurances, on the other hand, work as a motivating force against nuclear
weapons proliferation. South Korea is a good example of this. Because of a strong
security assurance from the United States, it has not, thus far, pursued a nuclear deterrent
capability of its own. The logic is simple. States pursue nuclear weapons programs in
order to balance against threats presented by other states. But, if a state facing threats can
receive an assurance from a state strong enough to balance against such a threat, states
can, and will, choose this option instead. Negative security assurances, as Scott Sagan
explains, are not effective in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. He argues that they
might “be helpful in the short-run, but will likely not be effective in the long-term given
the inherent suspicions of potential rivals produced by the anarchic international
system.”45
Even though the security model is relied upon too heavily, it is vital to examine in
any analysis of nuclear proliferation. The global security environment, however, is not
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changing in the way that the casual claims of many observers indicate. Thus, I will
examine the security environments of Iran, and particularly Turkey, in terms of the
emerging global system. The security environment of the emerging system, however,
will not revert back to the anarchic uncertainty that realist theory predicts.
Perceptions of power and security will change in the emerging system. Giovanni
Grevi argues that the emerging system should focus more on the evolution of the
relationships of the states and actors within the system.46 He continues, “[P]ower cannot
only be measured relative to that of others, but should also be assessed relative to the
changing level playing field of international relations and to the prevailing perceptions
and expectations therein.”47
The first important characteristic of the emerging international system is that it
will be more stable than traditionally assessed. Ariel Ilan Roth explains that one of the
basic assumptions of the causes of instability of multipolar systems is inaccurate. Roth
argues that buckpassing, contrary to popular belief, does not foster instability in a
multipolar international system. He claims:
[T]he long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic
stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an
incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined,
with new tests run and new conclusions explored.48

46

Giovanni Grevi, "The Interpolar World: A New Scenario." Occasional Paper, European
Union Institute for Security Studies (2009), p. 22.
47

Ibid., p. 23-24.

48

Ariel Ilan Roth, "Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory," International Studies
Review, no. 9 (2007): p. 369.
26

Buckpassing, Roth explains, occurs in multipolar systems because states may
constitute a threat to multiple other states. Thus, a state may be tempted to externalize its
security costs by passing the costs on to a third state in hopes that the third state’s efforts
to balance against a potential aggressor will be sufficient to secure itself.49 Thus,
conventional wisdom, as Roth indicates, has demonstrated that strong incentives to
buckpass create instability in multipolar systems; however, the notion of buckpassing is
rooted in a faulty understanding of British behavior before World War II. He explains
that a closer examination of the empirical evidence “shows that rather than externalizing
defense efforts, the relevant state incurred significant expense and made strenuous efforts
to balance the power of its putative rival.”50
Roth demonstrates that one of the key premises upon which the assumption that
multipolar systems are less stable than bipolar systems depends is a falsified premise but
falls short of claiming that multipolar systems are not less stable than bipolar or unipolar
systems.51 Roth explains that these fears are based on faulty assumptions, and that these
fears have become assumptions of multipolar systems. Thus, the fears that the emerging
multipolar system will be unstable are not entirely founded.
Likewise, Randall L. Schweller further demonstrates how the emerging
multipolar system may not be unstable as previously believed by utilizing the Second
Law of Thermodynamics and entropy as a theoretical framework. System processes as
opposed to system structures, argues Schweller, best explain international process. “And
49
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this process,” he continues, “is one of entropy.”52 Entropy, Schweller explains, is closely
related with “disorder and chaos because random configurations have a higher probability
of occurring more than more ordered ones.”53 With high levels of entropy, a system
cannot return to its previous energy state.54 He explains:
[M]aximum entropy (final equilibrium) will be reached when power capabilities
diffuse to other actors and none has any incentive to move from this condition;
that is, when there is equal energy among the primary units of the system (the
poles). At this point, the system will have reached a very unique form of
multipolarity—one that has never been seen before but whose arrival has been
predicted since the early 18th century.55
Haass also addresses the entropy that will occur in the nonpolar, or multipolar,
system, “[L]eft to its own devices, a nonpolar world will become messier over time.” He
continues, “Entropy dictates that systems consisting of a large number of actors tend
toward greater randomness and disorder in the absence of external intervention.”56 The
important aspect with regard to entropy is Schweller’s assessment that states will not
have an incentive to move from the conditions once maximum entropy is reached. This
means that, once maximum entropy is reached, states that do not have nuclear weapons
will not pursue them, which would disrupt the order of the system.
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Economic Interests
The balance of power in the emerging system is not shifting only between nation
states, but also non-state actors. Haass explains that the emerging system will have a
diffuse balance of power among a variety of state and non-state actors. He explains:
States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations;
from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOSs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and
in many places…. Today’s world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than
concentrated power.57
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the emerging international system will be
characterized by economics shifts, not shifts in military power. In addition to this diffuse
base of power, Haass also emphasizes the importance of regional actors in addition to the
6 major world powers (which he labels as China, the European Union, India, Japan,
Russia, and the United States). Some of these regional powers, such as Israel and
Pakistan are currently nuclear weapons states. Others, such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and South Korea are believed to be among those at highest risk to pursue nuclear
weapons. Even with these emerging powers—both globally and regionally—the United
States will remain the world’s foremost superpower by far with regards to military power
well into the future.
Grevi explains that understanding the relationship between states, particularly
with regard to economics, is crucial in understanding all aspects of the future
international system. He explains,
Today, the international system is marked by deepening, existential
interdependence. Interdependence is existential when its mismanagement can
threaten not only the prosperity but the political stability and ultimately, in
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extreme cases, the very survival of the actors that belong to the system. Under this
unprecedented condition, the ability to shape multilateral cooperation or lead
collective action in addressing international challenges becomes a central feature
of power.58
One of the more notable observations by Grevi is his interpretation of how the
balance is shifting. Traditionally, observers and theorists interpret any shift of power or
balance as a unitary quantity encompassing all aspects of state power like economics, the
military, and prestige. Grevi explains that the shift is primarily economic power, not
military power.59 “The broader political point,” explains Grevi, “is of course that a world
where three of the five largest economies will be Asian (China, Japan, and India) will be
a very different place.”60 This is a key observation. Traditionally, structural realist
thinking places the emphasis primarily on the military balance, and how states balance
with regard to military threats. Grevi, however, emphasizes that economics will be the
primary driver of balance shifts in the emerging international system. Economic power
struggles are markedly different than military power struggles, and this should be taken
into account when thinking about the emerging multipolar systems. What is good for a
state pursuing economic security is not the same as what is good for a state pursuing
conventional security. Although, China, India, and Japan are not only economic rivals,
they are also security rivals. India and China already have nuclear weapons, but what
about Japan? Could they change course and seek nuclear weapons in order to gain

58

Giovanni Grevi, "The Interpolar World,” p. 23-24.

59

Ibid., p. 17.

60

Ibid., p. 18.
30

security in an age where resources and economic interests may need to be secured from
economic and security rivals (read: China)?
Haass also highlights the importance economics plays in the emerging
international system. Not only is the American GDP increasing, that of other states is
increasing. Haass explains further:
GDP growth is hardly the only indication of a move away from U.S. economic
dominance. The rise of sovereign wealth funds -- in countries such as China,
Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- is another. These
government-controlled pools of wealth, mostly the result of oil and gas exports,
now total some $3 trillion.61
Additionally, globalization is a leading cause of change in the international
system and the interconnectedness that characterizes it. Haass argues:
Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many crossborder flows take place outside the control of governments and without their
knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers.
Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such
as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to
transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the
international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system
to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and
Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments).62
It is important to note that, while also constraining states, interconnectedness and
globalization also empowers states in ways that were not possible under the bipolar or
unipolar systems of the last century. Haass concludes, “It is easier than ever before for
individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power.”63
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Fareed Zakaria also emphasizes the rise of non-state actors. “Groups and
individuals have been empowered,” explains Zakaria, “and hierarchy, centralization, and
control are being undermined.” He continues, “Functions that were once controlled by
governments are now shared with international bodies like the World Trade Organization
and the European Union.”64
One of the most important aspects that is overlooked when speaking of the
emerging international system is that the United States will still remain as the
world’s strongest power, especially in terms of military strength. While it is true
that the relative power and influence of the United States is declining, and in turn
that of the rest of the world is increasing, analysts casually including the changing
international system within their reports grossly over estimate the degree of
relative power shifts.
Like the authors discussed above, he also claims that the shift away from
unipolarity is based mostly on economic strength, not military strength. These shifts,
claims Zakaria, are occurring in every other realm as well, except militarily.65 Like the
other authors, Zakaria also recognizes that the United States will remain the most
powerful and most influential player. Zakaria suggests, that instead of multipolarity, the
emerging system more closely resembles Samuel Huntington’s “uni-multipolarity,” or
what Chinese politicians refer to as “many powers, and one superpower.”66 “The messy
language,” explains Zakaria, “reflects the messy reality.”67 Zakaria claims, “We are now
living through the third great power shift of the modern era,” an era he refers to as, “the
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rise of the rest.”68 “Over the past few decades,” he continues, “countries all over the
world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were once unthinkable.”69
This robust economic growth, Zakaria claims, “is creating an international system in
which countries in all parts of the world are no longer objects or observers but players in
their own right.”70
Grevi addresses military and political constraint and empowerment to be
experienced by actors throughout the globe. Grevi argues, “[T]he deterrent function of
military power (notably when used asymmetrically) is acquiring increasing political
relevance.”71 He continues, “In short, from a political-strategic standpoint, it can be
argued that military power is increasingly a form of negative power, or power of
denial.”72 This concept is particularly important in terms of nuclear proliferation, as the
power of denial is one of the main external factors at play. We have seen this many times
over from both the United States and Israel. The United States went to war in Iraq over
the auspices of an Iraqi nuclear program. This is the most extreme example. Israel has
also bombed nuclear sites in Iraq as well as in Syria. Finally, the Stuxnet virus that
sabotaged Iranian centrifuges is another form of states trying to deny nuclear weapons to
other states. This also plays a large role in resource scarcity, which may cause increased
conflict. Grevi also explains, however, that the outreach of states other than the US or
68
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those in the EU is constraining western political influence.73 Grevi concludes this
discussion by arguing that negative power contains some short-term benefits, but
ultimately more risky long-term effects.74
But it is important that Grevi explains that this won’t happen naturally—it is
going to take serious effort on all parts of the international system to reconcile its
inevitable differences, especially with regard to resource scarcity and energy.
Furthermore, Grevi explains the importance of addressing the threat of the spread of
nuclear weapons as an issue on which the international community will need to
cooperate.75
Haass adds to this sentiment by explaining that alliances and partnerships will
“lose much of their importance.”76 Whereas these two authors don’t specifically claim
that the international community will be pressured into forming partnerships and
multilateral institutions, both emphasize that the unpredictability and serious issues that
need to be addressed give serious incentives for the international community to
cooperate. Haass concludes:
…[E]ncouraging a greater degree of global integration will help promote stability.
Establishing a core group of governments and others committed to cooperative
multilateralism would be a great step forward. Call it "concerted nonpolarity." It
would not eliminate nonpolarity, but it would help manage it and increase the
odds that the international system will not deteriorate or disintegrate.77
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As Etel Solingen explains that the political economy of a state is a large indicator
of its nuclear decisions:
Inward-looking models [of economic development] approximate necessary if not
sufficient conditions for nuclear weapons programs. Internationalizing models are
not necessary but likely to be sufficient for denuclearization except under two
circumstances: (a) when neighboring inward-looking regimes seek nuclear
weapons (or other WMD); and (b) when nuclear weapons were acquired prior to
the inception of internationalizing models.78
Thus, the decision to nuclearize, based on Solingen’s conceptual framework, is a
calculation based on the political survival of the ruling regime. Stephen F. Burgess
demonstrates how this model pertains to the Libyan rollback from nuclear weapons.
Qaddafi, explains Burgess, was fearing a growing movement challenging his power in the
country, and rolled back the nuclear weapons program in order to win over the “hearts
and minds” of the Libyan people, which could not be done while pursuing nuclear
weapons.79 As we see citizens of several countries throughout the Middle East rise up in
opposition of oppressive leadership, is it possible that leadership in other states will come
to the same conclusion, perhaps Syria or even Iran?
T.V. Paul argues, at least in some cases, economic interdependence decreases a
state’s desire to pursue nuclear weapons. He further argues, “The economic
interdependence of today is different from any in previous eras in terms of institutions,
scale, and depth.”80 He argues with regard to Germany, “Unilateral nuclear armament
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would run counter to German interest in integrating with [European] economies and
playing a larger role in these countries. With the end of the Cold War, Germany’s
security interdependence with other European states has increased, making it more
difficult for it to acquire an independent nuclear capability.”81 Although Germany is an
extreme case, this logic applies to other states as well. States are less likely to have
conflict or go to war with states if they are closely linked economically.82 If a state in a
close economic relationship with other states were to choose to pursue nuclear weapons,
its economic interests would surely suffer as its economic partners attempt to dissuade it
from its decisions. As the theories demonstrated above, incentives for states to form
economic partnerships are increasing dramatically; thus we should see a reduction in
motivation to pursue nuclear weapons.

Ideational Factors
Another way the emerging multipolar system differs from previous assessments
of multipolar systems is that ideas, norms, and identities play a larger role. For example,
Schweller claims, “[T]he social structure (or social purpose) of a given unipolar system,
not its material structure, determines the kind of politics that take place within the system
and the constraints exerted on the actors” (emphasis added).83 Schweller argues that, had
the Soviet Union won the Cold War, “Its unipolar system would likely have been
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dominated by brute force and coercion.”84 Schweller argues, states in the current
international system no longer have an incentive to aggressively expand, nor do other
states in the system fear this is so. And, without these expectations of conquest, the
complexity and uncertainty of the multipolar system should not cause instability.85
Schweller argues that this leads to a lack of constraints in the international system, not
continued restraint by the United States.86 Schweller, however, wrote before the
establishment of the preemption doctrine, which has demonstrated that the United States
is prepared to project its power overseas. Some states may see the preemption doctrine as
a sign that they need to take precautions against becoming the next target of a state
seeking to increase its own security to prevent preemptive attacks.
Haass also explains why the “unipolar moment” has ended. States develop; they
get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial and technological
resources that lead to productivity and prosperity.87 Thus, this indicates the rise of many
more actors, and can certainly lead to the decline of the United States.
Likewise, Martha Finnemore acknowledges that the emerging system will differ
from previous multipolar systems in that norms and legitimacy characterize the emerging
system. She explains, “The U.S.-favored liberal model of free markets and democracy
became the model of choice for states around the world not through overt U.S. coercion,
but in significant part because states and publics had accepted it as the best (ergo most
84
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legitimate) way to run a country.”88 She continues, “…[T]he structure of world politics,
however, is social as much as it is material.”89 She explains further, “Social structures of
norms concerning sovereignty, liberalism, self-determination, and border rigidity (among
other things) have changed over time and create vastly different political dynamics
among these systems.”90 As the United States enjoyed hegemony in both the bipolar
system, and the unipolar system that followed, it set in place certain sets of rules and
institutions. Finnemore explains, “To exercise power effectively, unipoles must
legitimate it and in the act of legitimating their power, uniopoles must diffuse it.”91
Through the use of norms and legitimate institutions used to further the interest of the
United States, they became an important part of the new international system.
In addition to the above assessments of the emerging international system,
Giovanni Grevi and Richard N. Haass present two alternatives: the interpolar system and
the nonpolar system, respectively. Grevi claims that the emerging international system is
an “unprecedented configuration of international relations,” and defines the interpolar
system as “multipolarity in an age of interdependence” coupled with the “redistribution
of power at the global level.”92 Grevi focuses on “what brings major powers together,”
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as opposed to “what sets them apart.”93 Grevi claims that interdependence and a
continuation of asymmetric balance of power will constrain states from acting
unilaterally or independently of others.94 This demonstrates that states will still be
constrained by certain forces and states in the international system, while simultaneously
becoming less constrained in other areas. For my purposes, this demonstrates that, even
though states like Turkey, Syria, and South Korea are less constrained by the
international system, the international system is still arranged in a way that constrains
them from pursuing nuclear weapons due to not only norms and international
organizations (namely the NPT), but also pressure from other countries (namely the
United States). Much research has been conducted on the role that norms play with
regard to the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons including Scott Sagan, Nina
Tannenwald, Maria Rublee, and T.V. Paul.
Sagan demonstrates that prestige, in what he refers to as the Norms Model,
“focuses on norms concerning weapons acquisition, seeing nuclear decisions as serving
important symbolic functions—both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.”95 France
is an excellent example of how prestige can drive proliferation. De Gaulle believed that
nuclear weapons would help restore France as a great power—to its rightful position in
the world.96 In this case, nuclear weapons become more of a political tool rather than a
military weapon. The French bomb also illustrates an important point about how the
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global system can affect nuclear calculations. De Gaulle chose to pursue his bomb in a
time when French prestige was at a low point, because only the United States and the
Soviet Union remained as global superpower after World War II. In this case, the
bipolar system was a motivating factor for France to balance the power of the United
States in order enhance its prestige.
Conversely, prestige can drive states to roll back, or forego, proliferation.
Though, “It took some time for this non-nuclear position to prevail,”97 as Cirincione
explains, non-proliferation has become a strong norm throughout the international
community. Today, 189 states are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
and nuclear weapons free zones exist in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Southeast
Asia/Pacific, Antarctica, the seabed, and outer space. States can find prestige in
leadership positions with regard to nonproliferation movements.98 Further, with regard to
rollback specifically, Ukraine found non-proliferation norms and abandonment of their
inherited nuclear arsenal as a way to enhance their international standing, according to
Sagan.99 In this case, this demonstrates a desire of some states to work more closely with
the international system, and, as I will demonstrate below, this will likely increase in the
emerging multipolar system.
Maria Rublee goes beyond the argument made by Sagan. She argues, “Though it
has taken a variety of forms, the rough normative trajectory within the international social
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environment has been to delegitimize nuclear weapons.”100 Rublee argues that norms of
nonproliferation are cemented in the formalization of the NPT, and, through this
formalization, “potential proliferators must face this norm and risk defying it.”101 She
acknowledges that the formalization of the NPT is not enough to keep states from
pursuing nuclear weapons, even among signatories to the treaty, but “[W]ithout the NPT,
the nuclear nonproliferation norm had no official platform from which to be
activated….The more the nuclear nonproliferation norm is activated, the more likely
policymakers are to commit to forgoing nuclear weapons.”102 Not only have norms
stemmed from ethical and moral assessments of nuclear weapons, they have also changed
the way states think about proliferation by shifting the cost-benefit analysis away from
simple threat analysis. Rublee explains, “The NPT created social and material incentives
for forgoing nuclear weapons as well as making it technically and practically difficult to
develop a nuclear weapons program.”103 The summary of her argument is as follows:
…[T]he international social environment, supported by first an emergent and then
a full-fledged nuclear nonproliferation regime, has helped to provide that systemic
impetus toward nuclear nonproliferation. The emerging antinuclear norm led to
the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which set forth a clear
inductive norm against nuclear proliferation; and then as states acceded to the
treaty, the expanding regime established a descriptive norm against nuclear
proliferation as well. The negotiations to create the regime, and the regime itself,
communicated that a nuclear weapons program was a violation of international
norms, instead of an act of national pride. In addition, international legitimacy
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was linked to nuclear nonproliferation; members of the international community
were expected to comply.104
Finally, ideational factors also include the psychology of the leadership, based on
the research of Jacques Hymans. Hymans explains that proliferation depends on the
personality of a state’s leadership. Whereas this model goes beyond domestic politics to
the individual level of analysis, the leader ultimately makes a decision on the domestic
political level. Hyman’s explains, “[L]eaders who hold a ‘national identity conception’
of ‘oppositional nationalism’ have a strong emotional tendency to decide to go for an
actual operational nuclear arsenal.”105 Whereas it is easy to see this principle
demonstrated using North Korea as an example (Kim Jong Il is nothing if not an
“oppositional nationalist”), India is a more nuanced example demonstrating how this
principle plays out in domestic politics. On the other hand, three other national identity
conceptions, according to Hymans, will ultimately choose to forgo nuclear weapons.
These national identity conceptions include: oppositional subaltern, sportsman like
nationalist, and sportsmanlike subaltern.106
Indira Gandhi, and the BJP after the Cold War, is often given credit (or blame)
with regard to India’s path to the bomb. Indira Gandhi possessed the characteristics of
the “oppositional nationalist” and believed that a bomb was needed to keep India secure,
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especially since China had one.107 After the end of the Cold War, George Perkovich
claims, “Only the [BJP] has favored the ‘great power’ norm to the exclusion (almost) of
the moral superiority-through-nuclear-self-restraint norm.”108 Also, those who contend
the Indian decision to finally complete nuclearization demonstrate that, since the end of
the Cold War, India did not test a bomb until 1998, almost immediately after the BJP
came into power.109 Even though security concerns factored into the decisions of Indira
Gandhi and the BJP, ultimately, it was the personalities of the state leaders that led to the
decision to nuclearize, and not the security concerns themselves. It should be noted,
however, that the BJP inherited the latent nuclear capability from its successors. It is not
necessary to explain how this theory leads to nonproliferation, as a state (any of the states
that are not the 10 or so currently possessing or pursuing nuclear weapons) simply lacks
leaders with the oppositional nationalist identity.
According to Nina Tannenwald, nuclear weapons have become taboo, which “has
constrained the practice of ‘self-help’ in the international system. States are not free to
resort to nuclear weapons without incurring moral opprobrium or political costs.”110
Tannenwald claims that the nuclear taboo has been created by three groups of factors: a
transnational antinuclear weapons movement, non-nuclear states’ strategic pressures and
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the risk of escalation, and the moral concerns of individual decision makers.111
Additionally, many material and normative factors played an important role: the
difficulty of mastering nuclear technology; rise of humanitarian norms; and the fact that
the US was the first one to actually use a bomb. Had the Soviet Union or China been the
first, she argues, the malevolent leaders who did not have to answer to its population may
not have restrained themselves.112 Tannenwald argues that the nuclear taboo reaches
beyond rationality and has become a genuine normative aspect of decision-making.113
Each of the driving forces discussed thus far can inform and steer proliferation
and rollback with regard to domestic politics. “Whether or not the acquisition of nuclear
weapons serves the national interests of a state,” explains Sagan, “it is likely to serve the
parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the
state.”114 In some cases, political entities may be most influenced by security concerns,
and other political entities may be more concerned with normative considerations.
International norms can constrain state behavior by “shaming” or “pressuring” various
political actors, according to Jeffrey T. Checkel.115 Checkel believes that norms go

111

Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of
Nuclear Weapons since 1945, p. 365.
112

Ibid., p. 365-366.

113

Ibid.,, p. 374.

114

Scott D. Sagan, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 63.

115

Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the
Rationalist—Constructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations, no. 3
(1997): p. 474.
44

beyond simply constraining behavior—they can actually shape actor’s preferences.116
The domestic politics model may be able to explain Egyptian nuclear restraint. Even
though many political forces within Egypt have been calling for a nuclear weapons
program for some time, Mubarak is the one that actually kept a lid on nuclear ambitions.
Now that he is no longer in power, some analysts are warning that the new government
may facilitate the nuclear ambitions of previously suppressed actors.117

Capacity
The final material variable is economic and technical capacities. These variables
are facilitating factors that allow a state to proliferate, not necessarily a driver in and of
themselves, but the converse is not necessarily true. A lack of economic or technological
capacity can be a driving force of rollbacks. In other words, if all of the other cards are in
place driving a state towards nuclearization, it will be forced to roll back if it does not
possess the adequate technology. Cirincione argues that economic sanctions hindered
Iraq’s technological capacity to build nuclear weapons.118 Can sanctions prevent states in
the future from obtaining the technology necessary to build nuclear weapons?
On the other hand, economic considerations can be a significant factor in
explaining rollback from nuclear weapons programs. Quite frankly, nuclear weapons
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programs are expensive—very expensive. Burgess explains that the cost of the Libyan
program were so great that it was damaging the Libyan economy and domestic
stability.119 In this case, economic capability is closely related to the political interests of
a state. Further, in addition to the expense of a nuclear weapons program and the
development of delivery systems, sanctions placed by the international community can
make the pursuit of nuclear weapons unfeasible. This was a large factor in Libya’s
decision to roll back its nuclear program. Burgess lists sanctions as his first reason Libya
rolled back its nuclear weapons program.120 On the other hand, sanctions were not
enough to keep Pakistan from attaining nuclear weapons.

Rublee explains, “Cases such

as North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran only underscore the point: if a country has the political
will, not even poverty or underdevelopment can keep it from building a nuclear weapons
program.”121
Katherine McCardle Kelleher questions, “can we really restore the genie to its
bottle, given the global spread of civil nuclear technologies, the near instantaneous
distribution technical literature, and a global commerce system poised to deliver any and
all necessary components through a myriad of legal and illegal channels?”122 Steven E.
Miller and Scott Sagan wrote in 2009 that we are living in a time where an interest in
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nuclear energy is surging. Furthermore, a close link exists between the capability to
produce nuclear energy and in producing nuclear weapons, and they ponder, “Will the
nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely
and heavily invested in nuclear power?”123
Dennis Gormley explains that the knowledge to construct nuclear weapons, which
he calls explicit knowledge, and related technology, will become more widely available
thanks to globalization and the Internet.124 From this point of view, one would expect
proliferation to become more widespread due to the ease of attainment. However,
Gormley explains that explicit knowledge is not sufficient to construct a nuclear weapons
and related technology. Tacit knowledge, the kind of knowledge derived from
experience, is necessary in order to construct nuclear weapons. He explains:
Whereas explicit knowledge consists of information or engineering formulations
that can be recorded and passed easily from one place to another, tacit knowledge
cannot be written down or passed via digital media. Rather, it is acquired through
the laborious and lengthy process of apprenticeship. Tacit knowledge, then, is the
product of a uniquely fertile social and intellectual environment composed of
mentors and proteges." Obtained as it is under these narrowly bounded
circumstances, tacit knowledge skills are not widely diffused in the way that
explicit knowledge is.125
The emerging international system will also have to face the challenge of
secondary proliferation. As more states are gaining the ability to enrich uranium, even
for peaceful purposes, the technology and knowledge (both explicit and tacit) are
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spreading as well. We have already seen this with states like North Korea and Pakistan
giving nuclear assistance to other countries. The Arms Control Association explains:
Recent assessments and press reports suggest that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea
have been able to circumnavigate the multilateral export control regimes in two
ways: one, by focusing on traditional supplier states for mass-market, dual-use
equipment and materials, and two, by complementing such acquisitions via a
parallel focus on emerging supplier states, such as India and Pakistan, for
materials and technology integration.126
Even though secondary proliferation poses a significant problem in the future,
particularly since more states will be less constrained by international pressures and
technology and know-how will be easier to obtain, the emerging international system
may actually hold the key to preventing secondary proliferation. Norms and regimes,
like export controls and international partnerships to combat the spread of illicit nuclear
materials, could effectively curb secondary proliferation. Furthermore, if we are to
believe that states will perceive the emerging system as less certain, states may choose to
withhold technical assistance to other states in fear that it may actually come back to be
detrimental to their security in the future.
Thus, it is important to examine the unique aspects of states with regard to
capacity. Some states may be able to easily obtain uranium for enrichment, while others
find it difficult. Some states may be getting backdoor assistance from other states like
China, Pakistan, or North Korea. Finally, capacity must be examined with regard to will.
Is a state likely to attempt to overcome capacity shortfalls such as economic capacity by
diverting funds and effort from other projects or government functions?
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CHAPTER 3 TURKEY: IN THE PATH OF A NUCLEAR CASCADE?

According to Stephen Larabee of the RAND Corporation, “Turkey would
consider developing the nuclear option only as a last resort—if, say, its relations with the
United States declined, Ankara no longer saw NATO's guarantees as credible, and the EU
rejected Turkey's membership.”127 Although each of these prospects is possible, they are
by no means enough to drive Ankara to begin a nuclear weapons program due to a
number of other factors that are not so likely to change due to the shifts in balance of
power in the emerging international system, particularly Turkey’s shift towards the
Middle East where it seeks to play a regional leadership role. Furthermore, it is likely
that Ankara will calculate that refusing to pursue nuclear weapons will give the prestige it
is looking for.
Security Environment
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
Many analysts worry that Turkey is at high risk of pursuing nuclear weapons if
Iran continues its ambitious enrichment projects. Ankara is not necessarily only worried
about the direct threat that a nuclear capable state on its borders poses, it is also
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concerned about larger instability that might be caused by Iranian pursuit of nuclear
weapons.128
Several factors contribute to increased vulnerability of Turkey. First, many fear
that Turkey will not sit idly by as Iran continues defying the IAEA as well as its
enrichment projects. A nuclear capable Iran on its borders will surely make some
Turkish officials nervous. Furthermore, Ankara is concerned about larger destabilization
in the region. The Iraq War has destabilized the region already to the point it has become
one of the most pressing aspects of Turkey’s security environment.129 Analysts believe
that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will destabilize the Middle East to an even
greater degree.130 This demonstrates that, even if Turkish officials are not concerned
about a nuclear-armed Iran, they will be concerned about the destabilization that occurs
throughout the region afterwards. Alexandra Bell explains, “The Turks look around them
and see conflicts and threats in most directions.”131 She also claims that these factors and
the shifting security environment are directly leading to the attitudes and opinions of
Turkish policymakers. Bell spoke to one unnamed Turkish official in particular that
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proclaimed, “Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb” if Iran obtained a
nuclear weapon.132
In addition to the changing security threats in the region, security assurances, or
possible lack thereof, will also play an important role in Turkey’s calculations in the
future. In the face of deteriorating relations within NATO, particularly with regard to
Turkey, Ankara is skeptical of the solid security assurance once given by NATO and the
United States.133 This sentiment is exacerbated by America’s desire to withdraw tactical
nuclear weapons from Europe, including Turkey. Ankara not only wants American
tactical nuclear weapons to remain on Turkish soil for the tangible deterrent effects they
offer, but also because some Turkish officials “believe that nuclear sharing is both
symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO
have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack.”134 For some Turkish
officials the symbolic effect of keeping US tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil
displays that the U.S. is still committed to Turkish security, even in a time when the
future of NATO is uncertain, particularly for Turkey.
It is easy to see that the uncertainty of the emerging international system is
leading to a shift in Turkey’s security environment. First, as Iran continues to defy the
IAEA in pursuit of enrichment, the Middle East is becoming destabilized as states
consider how and if to balance a new regional superpower. Furthermore, uncertainty of
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security threats is leading to the uncertainty of the future of NATO. Since NATO no
longer has the Soviet Union as a certain enemy, it has to reassess its role in the world, and
the security of Turkey is not among its priorities. Even with these uncertainties, the
security environment will not drive Turkey towards the bomb.
Motivations to Forgo Nuclear Weapons
It is important to examine Turkish behavior with regard to nuclear weapons
without considering the international system. Is it possible these trends, even if only in
part, will continue? Why would things be any different under multipolarity? Is the future
of Turkey’s security environment changing so rapidly and becoming more uncertain? The
changes in Turkey’s security environment have been slowly developing over decades.
Furthermore, uncertainty does not seem to be a large issue. To clarify, it is easy to
understand uncertainty surrounding Iran’s intentions, the future of NATO, or Turkey’s
future relations with the EU, but at least Ankara can be certain about the issues at hand.
Since these changes in Turkish policies and behavior have been happening for a while
now, we should be able to see some sort of movement toward increasing security through
traditional means. Instead, what we see is Ankara becoming more empowered as it
becomes more independent from the West. Turkey is not behaving like a state that is
fearful of an unpredictable and dangerous security environment being ushered in by the
emerging system. As Ian O. Lesser explains, “Turks prefer to focus on intentions rather
than capabilities when debating proliferation in their neighborhood. Improved relations
with Teheran and Damascus have simply lowered the perception of risk.”135
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Some analysts argue that Turkey is not concerned with nuclear weapons on its
borders because it tolerated the arsenal of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War.
Skeptics, and those that agree with the neo-realist assumptions, would claim that it is only
because Turkey was a part of NATO and had NATO nuclear weapons on its soil.
Skeptics would also claim that the fact Turkey wants U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to
remain within Turkish borders is a sign that Ankara values nuclear weapons. If Turkey
really believed that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter a nuclear Iran, however,
then it is doubtful that U.S. tactical weapons would play much of a role in Turkish
calculations.136 The weapons currently in Turkey would “take months to prepare them
for battle.”137 Additionally, NATO weapons require a complex 27-nation decision
process before use. The weapons currently on Turkish soil really had no direct effects.
Naturally, some analysts may predict that Turkey might not be so willing in the
future to continue practicing nuclear restraint, especially given the uncertainty of the
future of NATO or Iran’s intentions, but Turkey has demonstrated a long tradition of not
relying on nuclear weapons. Turkish officials are surely adding in their calculations
American and European concern over Iranian intentions and aspirations, which may
reassure Ankara that, even without a formal alliance, American and European actions will
play to Turkey’s favor. Given the growing relationship between Ankara and Tehran, it
does not seem that Turkish leaders would calculate they are at imminent risk of a possible
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future Iranian nuclear capability. Given this perception of Turkey’s security
environment, it would not make sense that Ankara would pursue nuclear weapons.
Also, many authors cite Turkey’s vehement opposition to the Iraq war as one of
the major signs of a US-Turkey split. Stephen F. Larabee claims, “81 percent of Turks
disapproved (and only seven percent approved) of President George W. Bush’s handling
of international policies.”138 This does not necessarily mean that US-Turkey relations are
falling apart. Some of the United State’s closes Allies, France, Germany, and Canada,
were also vehemently against the foreign policies of the Bush administration. Even
further, France had worse relations with NATO far longer than Turkey’s supposed falling
out. Yet, despite these issues, the alliance stuck together (though, I’m sure my critics will
point out that France had their own nuclear arsenal).
First, as mentioned above, Turkey seeks to play a leadership role in the Middle
East, and a larger, more prominent role in the international community. Despite
legitimate concerns of security and Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, pursuing
nuclear weapons would be even more harmful to Turkey’s prestige and leadership than
choosing not to proliferate. Even though Alexandra Bell claims that Turkey would
immediately pursue its own nuclear deterrent should Iran obtain a bomb, she also
acknowledges that much leadership in Turkey, with whom she spoke directly, showed
little interest in an Iranian nuclear capability, explaining that the Turks and the Persians
have not been in conflict with each other in over 500 years.139 It is unfortunate that so
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many analysts and commentators focus so heavily on sensationalized statements ignoring
other sentiments.

Economic Interests
Turkey’s economic interests and its internationalization model of economic
development will be strong motivators for Turkish politicians and leaders to forgo
nuclear weapons programs. Turkey has a long tradition of working with the West—both
the EU and the United States—and is not likely to give up the advantages of these
relationships even though they may not be as strong as they used to be. Furthermore, for
the foreseeable future, Turkey remains committed to joining the EU, or at least
maintaining good relations, and will not jeopardize this special relationship in exchange
for nuclear weapons research.
Though having faced a great number of setbacks and challenges, Turkey remains
committed to accession to the European Union, and evidence of Ankara’s commitment is
still evident. In early May 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan proclaimed, “We are
preserving our determination to join the EU.” He continued, “We are fulfilling our
commitments in the best way to harmonize with the [EU] acquis.”140 Turkey has spent
the last six years as an EU candidate implementing a number of reforms to meet EU
accession criteria.141 Further, some analysts and observers emphasize that it took Spain 8
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years to become an EU member, so it is likely that Turkey will remain patient,142
especially given the harsh economic environment that surely makes many European
leaders cautious to take on any more responsibility. If Turkey were to seek nuclear
weapons, its relationship with the EU would surely be severely damaged, ending Turkish
hopes of becoming a part of the world’s largest economic bloc.
Interestingly, Ankara’s economic ties with Iran also demonstrate reasons why
Turkey might not be willing and ready to proliferate in the future. Avi Jorisch explains
the extent of the Turkish-Iranian economic relationship:
In 2008, the two countries conducted $10 billion of business, and officials from
both countries have called for an increase to $20 billion by 2012. Iran exports
mostly oil and gas to the Turkish market. Naturally, Turkey wants to fuel its
economy, and Turkish officials have made it clear that they will look to all
available sources of energy, including Iran.143
Additionally, until May 2011, “Turkish companies and banks regularly abuse the
financial system to facilitate payments to [Iran],” as explained by the Hürriyet Daily
News.144 One should not perceive this type of facilitation as direct Iranian support by the
Turkish government; however, the Turkish government did not try to stop it until late
May 2011 when Turkish banks finally officially cut all ties with Iran’s top bank.145 This
is particularly telling given Turkey’s many attempts to, “[help] Iran circumvent
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intentional sanctions.”146 It seems as if Turkey places more importance in economic
strength than security concerns over a nuclear Iran.

Ideational Factors
In addition to the security environment, it is necessary to also examine a variety
of characteristics including the role prestige plays in decision-making, domestic political
dynamics, and the governmental structure itself.
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
For some analysts, even if the changing security environment is not enough to
push Turkey towards proliferation, prestige may complement security concerns and push
the country to its own bomb. Even though Turkey may not fear a conventional war with
Iran, prestige is likely to play a role in Ankara’s nuclear calculations. As Turkey’s
identity grows further and further from the West since the end of the Cold War, its
policies have shifted to become a leader in the Muslim world, as well as maintaining
close relations with the West, including the EU and NATO.147 Avi Jorisch explains, “If
Iran goes nuclear, it will become the regional hegemon, extinguishing Ankara’s hopes of
becoming a key player in the Middle East.”148 Turkey’s perception of prestige is closely
linked with a changing perception of its own identity. Once aligned closely with the
West, it is now growing closer and closer to the Middle East, and now wishes to play a
larger role in this region.
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With the Cold War over, Turkey is less constrained by geopolitical pressures and
now pursues foreign policies that would not have been possible under intense pressure
from the United States. Furthermore, Turkey’s domestic politics are becoming more
conservative, more religious, and more nationalist.149 For example, breaking away from
the West, Turkish policy has become more pro-Palestinian. This in itself is not an
indicator of Turkey looking for a new place in the Middle East, but in January 2006,
Prime Minister Erdogan hosted a high-ranking Hamas delegation in Ankara “hoping that
the visit would highlight Turkey’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role in the Middle
East.” A clear indicator that Ankara is less constrained than in previous years, Erdogan
arranged these meetings without first consulting Washington or Jerusalem.150
Another example of Turkey attempting to play a larger role in the Middle East
outside of a NATO or Western-led coalition is its opposition to sanctions on Iran with
regard to its alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons. Ankara had long pushed for a nuclear
fuel swap deal with Tehran in place of increased sanctions from the West. In May 2011,
Ankara finally signed a deal with Tehran in which Iran would ship low-enriched uranium
to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods. Under this agreement, the low-enriched uranium
(LEU) would remain property of Iran while in storage in Turkey.151 Prime Minister
Erdogan has proclaimed that this deal has eliminated the need for new sanctions aimed at
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Tehran.152 This example is not important with regard to whether or not this deal will
actually work, but rather because it demonstrates Ankara’s search for a greater role in the
region by attempting to broker a compromise between the West and Iran. As mentioned
above, should Iran obtain a nuclear weapon, the regional dynamics and diplomacy would
dramatically shift against the interests of Turkey.
Given the above examples of Turkey attempting to demonstrate its powerful role
in the region, it is likely that Ankara is more concerned about the diplomatic and
symbolic effects of an Iranian bomb. It is not unreasonable to predict that Turkish
leadership will seek its own nuclear capability to keep up with its impending nuclear
neighbor much like France pursued nuclear weapons during the Cold War. A shift in the
balance of influence would severely damage Ankara’s intentions of becoming a leader in
Middle East.
Motivations to Forgo Nuclear Weapons
The international system has focused so heavily on Iranian nuclear aspirations
that Turkey really doesn’t need to; thus, the international community (or, the West, more
accurately) is working harder on Turkey’s security environment, even if only indirectly.
Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has become less constrained both politically and
in terms of security threats. This is where the real shift in Turkish policies is happening.
Instead of Turkey feeling more vulnerable to threats, it is feeling more empowered to
assert itself in global politics.

152

Julian Borger, "Iran-Turkey Nuclear Swap Deal 'Means New Sanctions Are
Unnecessary'," Guardian.co.uk, May 17, 2010, accesed May 18, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swap-turkey.
59

The structure of the Turkish government will surely pose logistical problems
should Turkish leadership choose to pursue nuclear weapons. Because Turkey is an
open democratic society, building a clandestine nuclear weapons program will be
difficult.153 According to a poll conducted in early 2011, only three percent of Turks
believe that the biggest threat to Turkey comes from Iran; 43 percent, on the other hand,
believe that the largest threat comes from the United States.154 It is not likely that the
public will allow their political leaders to pursue nuclear weapons under these conditions,
so any effort to do so would have to be done clandestinely. Furthermore, environmental
concerns are growing in importance in Turkey, which has grave concerns over the
negative aspects of nuclear energy.155 This growing movement will make Turkish
nuclear energy ambitions more difficult to fulfill, thus making the possible pursuit of
nuclear weapons even more difficult in Turkey’s democratic system.
Furthermore, Turkey has a good track record when it comes to nuclear norms and
regimes. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) explains, “Turkey is not known to possess
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member and in
good standing of all the major treaties governing their acquisition and use.”156 Turkey is
either a party or signatory to arms control, nuclear, chemical, biological, testing, and
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technology regimes including: NPT, IAEA Additional Protocol, CTBR, PTBT, Chemical
Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, PSI, and many others.157 Whether
genuinely, or for self-serving purposes, Turkey has demonstrated a strong commitment to
norms and regimes. It is not likely that this will change in the future. Furthermore, if
Turkish officials do begin to stray from these norms, it will surely be met with intense
resistance from the international community. It is much more likely that Turkey will
obtain the prestige it seeks in the Middle East by demonstrating to other Middle East
states that reliance on norms and regimes are superior to the pursuit of nuclear weapons,
particularly given the many voices calling for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle
East.

Capacity
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
According to NTI, Turkey has the technological capability to establish a
successful nuclear energy program. NTI explains, “However, it lacks nuclear power
reactors and commercial-scale fuel cycle capabilities, meaning that foreign suppliers will
be key to Ankara's success in launching a nuclear power program.158 Turkey plans to
build additional reactors, and the recent Fukushima disaster in Japan has not deterred
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Turkey from pursuing nuclear energy.159 Prime Minister Erdogan has proclaimed that his
goal is to have at least 20 reactors online by 2030 with the help of Russian and Japanese
companies for the first plants.160
Turkey may also have a way to gain the know-how and tacit knowledge necessary
to build a nuclear weapons program. According to Leon Fuerth, it is possible that nuclear
scientists with knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons from the former Soviet
Republics may have made their way into Turkey.161
Motivations to Forgo Nuclear Weapons
These ambitious goals are not guaranteed to come to fruition. NTI explains that
Turkey has had plans to pursue nuclear power on three separate occasions, and each time,
“financial limitations and domestic or international political constraints prevented
success.”162 Unless things change, Turkey will not have the economic capacity to pursue
nuclear weapons in the future. Given Turkey’s ambitious nuclear energy goals, however,
analysts should watch to make sure technology is not being diverted to clandestine
nuclear weapons projects. In this case, it seems as if economic capacity, combined with
economic interests, is keeping a state from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
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Conclusions
The grim prospects that Iran poses to not only Turkey’s security environment, but
also its economic and political goals, combined with deteriorating NATO security
assurances, indicate that analysts must indeed keep a close eye on Ankara’s possible
nuclear weapons developments.
We should not fear that Turkey is in the path of a nuclear cascade sweeping
through the Middle East as a result of bold Iranian enrichment projects. If the changes in
the emerging international system were to cause major shifts in nuclear calculations,
Turkey’s policies would already be showing signs of caution and stronger security and
defense policies. Instead, Turkey is pursuing more active and unrestrained policies with
regard to economic policy and diplomacy. It is clear that Turkey is not too concerned
with an Iranian nuclear capability, as neo-realist theory would predict, because Ankara
seems to be enabling Iran’s uranium enrichment projects. Turkey’s economic policies
are bolstering Iran’s economic capacity. Simultaneously, Iran’s diplomatic efforts with
regard to nuclear fuel trade are averting international pressure and defying Western
efforts to stop Iranian enrichment.
Thus, it is clear that other factors clearly play a stronger role than the shifting
balance of power that is clearly taking place in the Middle East. Two factors play a role
in particular: prestige and economics. Whereas it is beyond the scope of this project to
assess the personalities of individual Turkish leaders, and the extent of their influence,
the policies examined above demonstrate a collective aspect of the personalities of
Turkish policymakers. Prestige in this case reflects the collective personalities of Turkish
leadership in what Hymans would label a sportsmanlike subaltern. Turkey is looking to
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improve its status by resisting the influence of more powerful states, while at the same
time, working within the international community to achieve its goals. Economics, on
the other hand, are important to Turkish officials not only for the improvement of the
country, but also as a way to form closer relationships with countries in the region,
whether Europe or the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 4 IRAN: ON THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Many analysts and commentators speak as if Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is
fact; however, all that is known is that Iran is currently pursuing large uranium
enrichment projects. Most people in Washington already believe that Iran is definitively
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, according to Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.163 On the other hand, Iranians maintain that their
program is for peaceful purposes only.
Whereas the evidence of Iran’s nuclear research is unsettling, it does not mean
that Iran will choose to go the extra step to weaponize. Many factors exist that may keep
Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons despite its pursuit of uranium enrichment. Such
factors include security concerns in the globalizing system, economic concerns,
personalities of the divided leadership—including the possible existence of norms and
religious edicts—as well as the technological capacity, which is being affected by the
globalizing economy as well.
Iran began its nuclear research in the 1960s under rule of the Shah, and according
to Jon Wolfsthal, has had an “on again, off again march toward mastering the entire

163

Karim Sadjadpour interview by Bob Scheffer. "Iran's Nuclear Secrecy," CBS'
Washington Unplugged, February 19, 2010, accessed May 7, 2011,
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=31017&solr_hilite=.

65

nuclear fuel cycle.”164 Over the years, Iran has hidden its enrichment projects from the
international community and has defied the IAEA on several accounts. Furthermore,
Tehran has dealt on the black market to obtain uranium and know-how, including
transactions with A.Q. Khan165 and dealings with foreign governments such as South
Africa. Because Iran’s nuclear progress thus far stretches decades, long before anyone
could hope to assess what the emerging international system would look like, it is
difficult to assess whether or not any of its current activities are a direct result of shifts in
the international system. It is not unthinkable that Iran might not decide to pursue
weaponization, as a number of countries have conducted extensive enrichment research
ultimately deciding not to weaponize including Brazil, Argentina, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Iraq, just to name a few.166
Should one closely examine documents and analyses of Iran’s nuclear program,
one theme is immediately obvious: inconsistency. Analysts can’t agree on Iran’s
intentions, its progress, or even when and if it was enriching uranium at various points in
time. Perhaps classified evidence exists that would be crucial in discovering the real
answer but, for those of us who do not have access to such information, I would like to
present an alternate point of view—one that challenges the assumptions many take as
fact. Iran is certainly influenced by international pressures, and the strength of such
pressures is growing due to the current changes in the international system as described in
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the previous chapters. These pressures must be taken into account, but they are often
ignored or dismissed.
Even Schelling, despite believing himself that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon,
acknowledges that no one knows whether or not Iran is actually planning on weaponizing
the fissile material it is currently attempting to produce.167 Likewise, several highranking U.S. officials do not speak or act as if Iran is definitively pursuing a nuclear
weapon. For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is quoted as saying,
“They're not close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time."168 Furthermore,
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has recently stated, “Iran's nuclear
decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international
community opportunities to influence Tehran."169 The statements of these high-ranking
officials give us some limited insight into what intelligence is assessing of Iran’s nuclear
weapons program, albeit only to a small degree. It is important to note that the reactions
and rhetoric of some of the nation’s highest defense and intelligence officials are not
consistent with that of the elected officials explained above.
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Security Environment
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
Many claim that the Motivations of Iran to proliferate are based heavily on
concerns about its security environment. Indeed, Iran lies on the edge of the international
system without any real allies. Furthermore, it is surely concerned about American
presence in the region, and has historically been concerned about other actors in the
region, particularly Iraq. As Joseph Cirincione explains, Iran exists on the edge of the
“periphery of the international system,” and such states have a more acute sense of
threats to their national security. Further, states in Iran’s position on the periphery have
more incentive to pursue a nuclear weapon.170 Iran is balancing against a variety of
powers, globally and regionally. They will continue to perceive threats from both
regional and global powers. More generally, Iran hopes that a nuclear capability will
reduce or eliminate U.S. interference or opposition to Iran’s domestic and foreign
policies.171
Shahram Chubin explains, “Iran’s nuclear weapons program was part of a broader
attempt to become more self-reliant in arms and technology in the 1980s.” He continues,
“Increasingly isolated, Tehran struggled to acquire arms to fight Iraq, which used
chemical weapons and had a nuclear weapons program. The eight-year war was the
Middle East’s bloodiest modern conflict. Iran’s nuclear program was an outgrowth of this
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experience.”172 Ayatollah Khomeini approved Iran’s modern nuclear program, which
began in 1985 when Iran saw the advances of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
program. “Iranian leaders concluded,” Colonel Anthony C. Cain explains, “that they
could ill afford to allow regional competitors to gain again the upper hand in the nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons arena.”173 Cain continues, “The U.S.-led coalition’s
apparent difficulty in dismantling the Iraqi program during and after Operation Desert
Storm left the Iranians with little confidence in international collective security
mechanisms.”174 Iran’s distrust of collective security mechanisms underlines the selfhelp factor that is characteristic of realist interpretations. Iran now has even more power
to balance against in the region, and a bomb is an easy way to balance against those
powers in the face of deteriorating conventional capabilities.175
Before 9/11, Iran’s prime motivation to seek a deterrent capability was Iraq, but
since, the United States has become the primary reason behind motivations to proliferate
“to compensate for strategic isolation….”176 The United States occupies and maintains a
strong presence on two of Iran’s borders, and has military bases in countries throughout
the Middle East, as well as tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey, a NATO ally, which
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surely exacerbates feelings of insecurity in Tehran. Further, Israel, as the primary enemy
of Iran in the region, possesses nuclear weapons. Finally, it is likely that Iran feels more
insecure because of the American arms deal with Saudi Arabia providing $60 billon in
arms sales.
Additionally, as Willis Stanley explains, “…Iranian lack of trust in the
international ‘system’ makes it difficult to construct a set of positive inducements that
would both preclude Iranian deception and provide reassurance to the Iranians that the
deal struck will be honored by the ‘Great Satan’ and its minions.”177 Recent U.S. claims
and statements of both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have exacerbated
this distrust. Under the George W. Bush administration, U.S. Officials iterated time and
time again that it had nothing but violent intentions concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
It’s only been eight years since President George W. Bush called for regime change in
Tehran in his State of the Union Address.178 Further, “President Bush had denounced the
governments of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as members of an “axis of evil’” with ties to
international terrorism.”179 Even more recently, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has
reassured Iran that the United States will not rule out the use of force, including nuclear
force, for states continuing to pursue nuclear weapons programs.180
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Finally, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review boldly states, “[T]he United States is
now prepared to strengthen its long-standing ‘negative security assurance’ by declaring
that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.”181 This phrasing is also a signal that the United States reserves
the right to use nuclear force against states that are not in compliance with NPT
obligations, including Iran.
As Iraq, once Iran’s most pressing foe in the region, is no longer an imminent
threat to Iranian security, Israel and the United States have recently demonstrated the
extent of their capabilities and ability to extend power throughout the region. Some
analysts conclude that, in order for Iran to balance this power, it needs nuclear weapons.
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation
Israel has a history of attacking places that it thinks might have nuclear weapons.
Israel attacked a site in Syria in 2007, and a site in Iraq in 1981. Furthermore, the United
States has a demonstrated track record of complete regime change. Some analysts have
argued that Iran has certainly learned from these lessons and, as a result, constructed its
nuclear enrichment plants deep underground all across the country.182
Furthermore, Iranian officials may not perceive Israel and the United States as
great threats to Iran. Etel Solingen argues that the claims of analysts who argue that
Israel and the United States are driving Tehran towards nuclear weapons because of the
security environment they have created in the region are not accurate. She argues that the
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drive towards nuclearization in the 1980s was mainly a result of the threat Iraq posed.183
Solingen explains, “…[B]ut many in Iran disagree with the premise of these threats or
how to cope with them, pointing to nuclear weapons as potentially undermining or
enhancing security, depending on the eyes of Iranian beholders.”184

Economic Interests
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
Willis Stanley stresses that we “must consider the near total role petroleum
products play in Iran’s calculus.”185 Whereas oil embargos and targeted sanctions would
be effective, Stanley explains further, “[T]he mechanics for organizing such an effort are
vulnerable to exactly the tactics at such the Iranian leadership excels.”186 The weapon of
choice in attempting to coerce Tehran to halt its nuclear research is sanctions. Sanctions
have not only come from the United States, but Europe, and the international community
as a whole in the form of U.N. resolutions. The United States has had sanctions in place
on Iran since 1979, and five American presidential administrations have imposed
sanctions since.187 Since 2006, The U.N. Security Council has passed six resolutions
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designed to eliminate Tehran’s ability to pursue its ambitious nuclear research.188 James
Dobbins of the RAND Corporation explained in a testimony to Congress in December
2009, “Further international sanctions will probably not compel a change in Iran’s
nuclear policies nor cause a halt to those programs.”189 Whereas Dobbins explained that
sanctions have not worked historically,190 other reasons exist why sanctions will be
ineffective in Iran. In 2010, Ray Takeyh and Suzanne Maloney wrote argue that sanctions
“…will not be ‘crippling’, as Mrs. Clinton once promised, because they do not directly
strike at the Islamic Republic's lifeblood - its oil revenues, which total in the tens of
billions.”191 The authors continue, “As a result, it will now focus its energies on averting,
circumventing, insulating and even exploiting them, endeavours that the regime has
elevated to an art form.”192
Furthermore, sanctions may be ineffective because Iranian leadership focuses its
economic resources toward weaponizing instead of other areas they may be needed.
Commentators argue that sanctions will remain ineffective because Iran is so motivated
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to pursue nuclear weapons it will not allow economic restraints get in its way.193 This is
similar to Pakistan’s approach to nuclear weapons after the United States placed
sanctions on the country in attempt to halt Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Instead of diverting money away from the nuclear program to benefit the Pakistani
people, Prime Minister Bhutto vowed that the Pakistani people will "eat grass" if
necessary in order to develop nuclear weapons.194
For a while, the emerging international system worked in Tehran’s favor as it
used banks in Turkey to sidestep sanctions. Turkey was desperate enough for a closer
economic relationship that it was willing to work with Iran in exchange for economic
support. This relationship made it possible for Iranian funds to enter Europe under the
auspices of Turkish banks.195 In May 2011, however, Turkey terminated this
relationship, and Iran can no longer rely on Turkish banks to sidestep sanctions.196
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation
The economic interests of Iran are a vulnerability of its nuclear weapons program
because they rely so much on materials obtained from outside of its borders and produced
and delivered by other states. The increased interdependence of the emerging system will
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only exacerbate this problem, making Iran even more vulnerable to external political
economic pressure. Matthew Levitt Claims that, because of the globalized economy,
unilateral sanctions from the United States will be more effective than previous
sanctions.197
The Iran Primer explains, “Increased international pressure and sanctions are
likely to increase the program’s costs, which is also likely to make the program more
contentious at home – and potentially exacerbate existing political differences in the
leadership.”198 The document continues to argue, “The weapons component of the
program has never been debated or acknowledged and further revelations or costs
associated with it could make it more controversial.”199 Thus, sanctions and lack of
material for a nuclear weapons program could make the costs of weaponization
unacceptable.
Iran has been pursuing its enrichment experiments using 600 tons of yellowcake
uranium bought from South Africa in the 1970s, and its supply is diminishing.200 And
even though Iran mines its own Uranium, it does not have enough to fulfill the needs of a
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nuclear power program, according to Jacqueline Shire.201 It depleted its stockpiles of
uranium in its mines in the 1970s.202
This does not mean that Iran is incapable of getting more uranium, but it does
mean that Iran has to rely on other states to supply the needed material. This means that
Iran is even more susceptible to international pressure. Iran currently looks to several
states from which to purchase uranium including Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. A
coalition of Western States including the United States, Canada, France, Britain,
Germany, as well as Australia have lobbied the governments of these countries not to sell
uranium to Iran.203
Bahgat explains that several international companies on which Iran relied for its
nuclear program have backed out of the country as a result of pressure from the United
States.204 Furthermore, their program has relied heavily on foreign assistance,
particularly form China, Pakistan, and Russia at different times throughout its
existence.205 Is it possible that Chinese assistance will grow because of China’s growing
power in the emerging system? What about Russia? Will its influence grow weaker?
The EU is already trying policies to offer incentives coupled with unfavorable
side effects with regard to Iran. Bahgat explains, “Since the early 2000s, the EU has
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negotiated a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with Iran.” He continues, “The
EU has established linkages between progress on the TCA negotiations and changes in
Iran’s position on the Arab-Israeli peace process, terrorism, and proliferation of
WMD.”206 In 2003, France, Germany, and the UK started negotiations with Iran that
eventually led to Tehran signing the Additional Protocol of the NPT and to freeze some
of its nuclear activities.207 This is not to say that this has been completely successful, as
Iran has recently stated that it has resumed enrichment, but it does demonstrate a linkage
between economic incentives and norms.

Ideational Factors
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
In addition to Iran’s security environment, many analysts, commentators, and
observers also acknowledge the large role that state characteristics play in Iran,
particularly the sense of prestige pursued by the state’s leadership. The Iran Primer
explains that Iran’s nuclear program has “unfolded in context of its overall policies,”208
which were created in order to obtain prestige and self-reliance. If we are to believe the
Iran Primer, then it is unlikely that the emerging international system has had anything to
do with its nuclear enrichment projects. If anything, it was under the bipolar system that
many of the drivers of Iran’s nuclear program came into existence.
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Bahgat explains, “Most Iranians perceive their nation as a great civilization that
has been deprived of its ‘rightful’ status as a regional superpower by foreign intervention,
including the Russian, British, and American.”209 Iran’s leadership has not only declared
its right to enrich uranium again and again, but it has also demonstrated how prestige
comes from scientific endeavors, as well as from defying the West.
A group of researchers from a variety of academic institutions in the United States
and France conducted a psychological survey of a “small but politically significant
portion of the Iranian population” has found that many Iranians have begun to see nuclear
energy as a “sacred value” which may lead many Iranians to think of nuclear energy in
terms beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis.210
More recently, though once quiet on the issue, Ayatollah Khamenei has spoken
about Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. The supreme leader has proclaimed, “We only
seek to awaken the spirit of dignity in the whole of the Muslim community,” which was
apparently in response to an IAEA report just a few days earlier.211 This demonstrates
that, even though analysts often rely on the deep divisions within Iranian leadership,
consistency exists throughout with regard to importance of pursuing nuclear energy.
Karim Sadjadpour, Ali Vaez, and Fariborz Ghadar argue, “A combination of
misguided nationalism and government misinformation has compelled many non-official
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Iranian elites -- including staunch regime critics -- to support the Islamic Republic's selfprofessed ‘inalienable’ nuclear pursuits.”212 Additionally, the Iran Primer, published by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explains:
The program may also have been a byproduct of the troubled revolution’s
omnipresent need for legitimacy and Iranian nationalism’s quest for respect and
international status. Tehran has long sought access to nuclear technology
generally as a key to development and a means of restoring its former greatness as
a center of scientific progress…. The regime views the international community’s
dictates as an attack on a founding principle of the revolution, namely Iran’s
independence from outside influence or intervention.213
Self-reliance is not only a key founding value of the republic,214 but also a lesson learned
after its protracted war with Iraq. It is also likely that sanctions will exacerbate feelings
among Tehran’s leaders that it must be self-reliant because the West, particularly the
United States, has consistently attempted to coerce Iran with sanctions and even threats of
regime change.
The Iranian nuclear issue has transformed due to domestic politics across several
different periods of time. Initially, they argue, the nuclear issue was supposed to be a
national issue, and “there appeared to be a general consensus among the political elite…”
with regard to enriching uranium.215 In recent years, the issue has become much more
politicized, and both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad use the issue to “stigmatize” their
critics. Reformists were labeled as being soft, complacent to demands of the United
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States, and “willing to negotiate away Iran’s Interests.”216 Through this kind of political
isolation, the forces within the Iranian government pushing Tehran away from nuclear
weapons are becoming weaker and weaker. For some, this indicates that the domestic
political processes will actually facilitate Iranian proliferation.
Could this combination of prestige, self-reliance, and domestic politics push
Tehran towards constructing a nuclear weapon?
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation
Although the issue of prestige and the personalities of some of Iran’s key
leadership would indicate that Iran is on the path to the bomb, when examined more
closely, the evidence becomes much more complex and nuanced. In this section, I will
examine the characteristics of the Iranian government that are pushing it away from the
pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Robert Baer, a former CIA operative, has written extensively on what he believes
to be Iran’s true motivations and intentions in his book, The Devil We Know: Dealing
with the New Iranian Superpower. He not only dismisses many of the assumptions he
believes American’s have taken for granted, he seeks to restructure the way Americans,
both the public and the government, understand Iran. “President Ahmadinejad is…a
figurehead no more able to take Iran to war than Joseph McCarthy was able to take
America to war against Communism,” claims Baer. Iran’s real leaders,” he continues,
“are rational, pragmatic, and calculating.”217
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Baer claims that Americans are too focused on the worst-case scenario, which is
not what Tehran really wants.218 A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) claimed
that Tehran stopped its pursuit of a bomb in 2003. To Baer, this indicated two things:
that Iran was in no hurry to obtain a bomb; and that nuclear weapons are not essential to
Iran’s security.219 Because Iran’s leadership is calculated and patient, Baer argues,
“Right now, at least, Iranians don’t need a nuclear bomb.” He continues, “If a war is to
be fought…Iran will almost certainly fall back on its asymmetrical tactics and weapons.”
He concludes by indicating that Iran will likely calculate that the continued pursuit of a
bomb will be more detrimental than relying on these other tactics and strategies.220
As mentioned above as a facilitator of proliferation, Iran is driven by prestige, but
it is possible that prestige, like with Turkey, will actually push Tehran away from
producing nuclear weapons. “Iran wanted to be taken seriously as a major power,”
claims Baer, “in the same way it wanted to control the Hormuz and the world’s oil.”221
He continues,
But at the same time, the Iranians see a nuclear bomb as nice to have but
not crucial to their survival…. Iran may not yet have nukes, but it has three things
that are vastly more important: highly developed asymmetrical fighting skills and
weapons; a growing army of hungry, disaffected, street-smart fighters; and an
invincible anticolonial message. With that, Iran has set the stage for its push
toward empire—a push they’ve already begun.222

218

Robert Baer, The Devil We Know, p. 77.

219

Ibid., p. 23.

220

Ibid., p. 110.

221

Ibid.

222

Ibid., p. 111.

81

Thus, in a complicated political environment where various factions of the
government are pitted against each other, those in favor of weaponization may not be so
dead set on obtaining a bomb when prestige can be obtained other ways.
The Iran Primer explains, “The most fundamental difference is whether Iran
should continue as a revolutionary state willing to defy the world, or whether it should
settle down and become a normal state that plays by international rules. The nuclear issue
is increasingly a reflection of this basic division.”223 This may mean that the will of the
leadership to enhance its position and standing in the world may be largely affected by
the emerging international system. Could leadership that is rational and bases much of its
decisions on cost benefit analyses see that weaponization is actually harming its position?
With regard to norms and institutions, the most common assumption among
analysts is that Iranian leadership does not adhere to them. It is important to remember
that Iran has shown no signal of leaving the NPT thus far, despite several violations and
attempts to side-step IAEA regulations and inspections. Even if it does not idealistically
agree with the goals of the IAEA and the NPT, it goes to great lengths to maintain a
relationship with the organizations. Furthermore, stronger evidence of norms exists
within Iran.
Before 2005, many within Iranian politics opposed enrichment.224 If these
aspects of the Iranian government become more prominent in the future, is it possible that
they will be more willing to negotiate and cooperate with the West? Furthermore, is it
possible that they will give up the idea that uranium enrichment, and nuclear weapons,
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are not needed to bolster Iranian prestige? This does not seem likely given the recent
growing rift between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad. It is more likely that hardliners will
continue to expand their dominance within Iranian politics.
Furthermore, often talked about in passing, Iranian leadership claims that
Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa prohibiting the production and use of nuclear
weapons. Unfortunately, no one has ever seen this fatwa, as it has never been published.
But the fact that Iranian leadership claims it exists is quite meaningful in itself. Whereas
it is certainly not an assurance that the Islamic Republic will not build nuclear weapons, it
does demonstrate that the existence of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to some.
Furthermore, in February 2010, Khamenei reemphasized that Islam doesn’t allow for
nuclear weapons:
Iran will not get emotional in its response to these nonsensical statements,
because we have often said that our religious tenets and beliefs consider these
kinds of weapons of mass destruction to be symbols of genocide and are,
therefore, forbidden and considered to be haram (religiously banned).225
Unless Khamenei is intentionally misleading the international community, how
would it be possible to pursue nuclear weapons? Although, it may be possible that future
leadership may not have a similar point of view with regard to Islam and nuclear
weapons.
More evidence of norms exists. In a legislative initiative, government officials
voted on a measure that would ban the production of nuclear weapons. Although this
measure failed to pass, it still indicates that norms play a role in Iranian politics. To
some, the fact that this measure even became an issue means that the fatwa does not exist,
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because if the supreme leader had already banned the production of nuclear weapons,
there would be no need to create a legislative initiative. The fact that this even came up,
however, in the Iranian government demonstrates that norms play a role in nuclear
calculations, though, they may not be strong enough to keep Iran from ultimately
pursuing nuclear weapons.
One important aspect of Iran’s state characteristics are the deep divisions that
exist within the government. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure of how the divisions are
affecting Iran’s nuclear choices. Jeffrey Lewis explains that a variety of viewpoints exist
within the Iranian government “ranging from those who want the bomb now, to those
who want a capability, to those who want to demonstrate Iranian scientific achievement
to the world, to those who don't want a bomb but realize…that if they oppose the uranium
enrichment program, they will appear to be weak.”226
In June 2011, President Ahmadinejad admitted the rift between the clerics and
himself publicly for the first time. The National reported, “Mr. Ahmadinejad and his
closest allies alarmed the clerics by seeking to refashion the state's ideology on nationalist
- rather than Islamist - lines, and to shift its centre of political power from the clergy to
the presidency.” The paper continued, “The clerics are also outraged by Mr.
Ahmadinejad's religious populism. Appealing to a less educated poorer population, he
claims a direct connection with Shiism's hidden 12th Imam, the messianic Mahdi, and as
such claims that he doesn't need clerical supervision to govern on Islamic principles.”227
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Ahmadinejad claimed in a news conference in June 2011 that he and his supporters are
“180 degrees away from [Khamenei and his supporters]—We are actually on opposite
sides.” 228 This rift has led Roger Cohen to declare, “That’s not how you make a
nuke.”229 Jeffrey Lewis concludes, “…[I] don't think any of us know what decision the
Iranians will make when they actually get to the point where they can build a bomb."230
Not only have the President and his supporters angered the religious elite,
particularly Ayatollah Khamenei, the mullahs have also alienated the President and his
supporters. The Economist reports, “The supreme leader’s inflexibility now looks like an
error. He has infuriated those moderate conservatives who recognise that the events of
the second half of last year have changed Iran irrevocably, and who advocate concessions
in the name of national unity.”231
Shahram Chubin argues that, despite consensus within Iran with regard to the
right to nuclear energy, no evidence of consensus exists in Iran with regard to nuclear
weapons—most people just believe that one exists.232 “Divisions on the nuclear question
exist,” argues Chubin, “and are in fact a surrogate for a broader question: how should
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Iran relate to the international community?”233 Differences exist within Iran between
those that “seek a larger role for Iran in the international community as a normal state,”
argues Chubin, and “those who wish to acquire a nuclear weapons capability to continue
to confront the West….”234
Ayatollah Khamenei is likely concerned about regime security, and slowly
building a bomb, he has surely concluded, is only detrimental to regime security. As
mentioned above, they have surely taken notice of what the United States and the
international community have done in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya. On one hand,
yes, perhaps this has only solidified the need for a nuclear deterrent capability in the
minds of Iran’s leadership. After all, would NATO have intervened in Libya had Qaddafi
had a nuclear deterrent capability? This calculation is useless, however, since they are
building it incredibly slowly, and surely won’t be able to create a deterrent capability any
time soon, even if they do successfully test a weapon. Roger Cohen argues:
Remember, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, is the guardian of the revolution.
That is a conservative business. Breakout, let alone a bomb, is a bridge too far if
the Islamic Republic is what you’ve vowed to preserve. Much better to gain
leverage by producing low-enriched uranium — far from weapons grade — under
International Atomic Energy Agency inspection and allow rumors to swirl.235
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Capacity
Motivations to Pursue Nuclear Weapons
For many, the progress Iran has already made towards enrichment is damning
evidence that it seeks nuclear weapons. Recently, the IAEA has stated that its knowledge
of enrichment activities in the Islamic Republic is diminishing, meaning that the IAEA
can no longer be certain of Iran’s undeclared enrichment activities. The IAEA also
recently claimed that Iran is currently running 8,000 centrifuges used to enrich
Uranium.236
As mentioned earlier, Iran currently possesses a significant capacity to enrich
uranium. Furthermore, it has a capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but only to a certain
extent. Some say that Iran’s quest for a nuclear capability goes far beyond cost-benefit
analysis and is rather an issue of prestige and defiance. It could be that Iran is taking the
road taken by Pakistan, as examined above. If this is the case, then it doesn’t matter how
much it costs. Iran will certainly have the economic capacity if they divert money away
from other places. Furthermore, like Pakistan, they will go to great lengths to overcome
the effects of sanctions put in place by the West. Peter Cassata reported in January 2009
that it is estimated that Iran has enough uranium to build “several dozen” nuclear
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weapons.237 He also reported that any effort to stop countries from selling Iran any more
uranium would likely be unsuccessful.238
Motivations to Forgo Proliferation
For years, analysts and commentators have predicted that Iran is only a few years
away from a bomb, but, as time passes, Iran does not seem any closer to completing a
nuclear weapon. But it is possible that Iran may not have either the technical or the
economic capacity to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if this capacity exists, it is not
unlikely that Iranian leadership may perceive forgoing nuclearization as preferential.
First, Iran may not be able to obtain enough uranium for its ambitious enrichment
activities. Second, it may not see the exorbitant cost of its nuclear program worth
expanding in order to produce enough uranium for a nuclear arsenal. Sadjadpour, Vaez,
and Ghadar explain:
The economics of Iran's nuclear approach, however, suggests that its astronomical
costs appear to dwarf its minimal benefits. The country's lost foreign investment
in its energy infrastructure -- estimated to be around $60 billion -- is unlikely to
ever be redeemed by nuclear energy, as power generated by the Bushehr plant can
only satisfy two percent of Iran's projected electricity consumption. By
comparison, 18 percent of Iran's electricity is wasted through transmission
because of technical problems and mismanagement. The country's scarcity of
domestic uranium resources and the inefficiency of its obsolete centrifuge
technology mean that Iran's immense investment in uranium enrichment facilities
will probably never pay off. In the most optimistic scenario, Iran's projected
uranium reserves could only supply one nuclear reactor for less than a decade.239
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Also, the small amount of uranium that Iran is able to mine domestically suffers
from purity problems.240 This means that Iran has to get its uranium from somewhere
else, as mentioned above. We know that Iran attempted to smuggle uranium out of the
Congo in 2005, but were caught.241 How much uranium is it smuggling? Is this a
possible lever for intervention by the international community? It seems that if the
international community works together to stop the illegal smuggling of uranium, then
Iran will be forced to work with what little supply it has. Furthermore, the more weapons
like the Stuxnet virus work to delay, complicate, and sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment
activities, Iran’s supply of uranium will dwindle even quicker and become less
productive.
According to analysts, the recent Stuxnet worm “wiped out roughly a fifth of
Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and helped delay…Tehran’s ability to make its first nuclear
arms.”242 Furthermore, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claims that sanctions have
considerably hindered Tehran’s ability to procure components necessary to develop
nuclear weapons.243 These analysts also claim “sanctions have hurt its effort to build
more advanced (and less temperamental) centrifuges.”244 Many critics of sanctions often
complain that they don’t work because they actually create more motivation for the
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leaders of states to continue what they are doing. But here, it is not important that Iran’s
mind is changed. What is more important is that they lack the capacity. It would be very
difficult to change their mind (though, I must admit, if they were already not looking to
weaponize, this may push them over the edge), and, in this case, it is much easier to
affect the supply rather than the demand. With greater internationalization, more states
have incentive to cooperate with the West.
This brings up an important point. Even if Iran is to obtain the bomb in the future
(or near future), it is because the important changes of the international system have not
yet pushed other, smaller states, into cooperating with the West. It is important to
remember that two things are going on in Iran that affect this analysis. First, Iran has
been pursuing the steps to the bomb for quite some time, long before the new effects of
the emerging multipolar system came into play. Second, the effects of the emerging
multipolar system that we can currently observe are in their nascent stages. They might
not be mature or developed enough to stop a country that has already gone to great
lengths to enrich uranium for as long as Iran has; however, even if these things do not
stop Iran from proliferating, I have demonstrated here that the effects of the multipolar
international system have hindered, not hastened, Iran’s proliferation decisions.

Conclusions
When only examining the evidence of Iran’s current nuclear enrichment projects
with select remarks from President Ahmadinejad, it certainly seems as if Iran is on a path
to the bomb, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions must be examined in a broader context.
Furthermore, many Iranian state characteristics are pushing Iran away from pursuing
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weaponization, and the emerging international system is making the drivers of forgoing
nuclear weapons capabilities that much stronger.
Even though Iran is a pariah state with outspoken leaders who attempt to defy the
West whenever possible, the leadership of Iran is deeply divided. Furthermore, as Robert
Baer argues, Iranian leadership is highly calculative, patient, and rational. The evidence
presented above demonstrates how such leadership could certainly choose to forgo
weaponization. Additionally, it is possible that norms play a role in Iran pushing the
country away from weaponization. As examined above, many leaders have claimed that
nuclear weapons are against Islamic law, and efforts have been made within the
legislative bodies to ban the production of weapons. Whereas the forces of these norms
may not be strong enough by themselves to prevent weaponization, when combined with
the other drivers, such as the divided leadership, and economic capacity, weaponization
becomes less likely.
The emerging international system is also pushing Iran away from weaponization.
First, as the economy becomes more and more globalized, it is becoming more difficult
for Tehran to procure the materials needed due to international pressure and regulations
on supplying states. Furthermore, as has happened with Turkish banks, international
pressure on foreign governments has eliminated Tehran’s ability to side-step sanctions.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS
The case studies examined represent both a best and worst-case test for my
hypothesis that the emerging international system will not increase nuclear weapons
proliferation as many analysts and commentators have recently feared. In both tests, I
demonstrated that the characteristics of the emerging system will actually push states
away from pursuing nuclear weapons. I also demonstrated that state characteristics
unlikely to be affected by shifts in the emerging system, such as norms or political
institutions, are capable of only pushing states further from nuclear weapons. When
these drivers are examined together, it is unlikely that states will pursue nuclear weapons
in the emerging system as traditionally expected. This conclusion will examine the
similarities, as well as the differences between the likely calculations of both Turkey and
Iran.
Security Environment
As expected by neo-realist theory, the emerging international system is creating a
less certain security environment for many countries, particularly in the Middle East, but
this changing security environment is not enough to drive either state towards nuclear
weapons. Because the United States will remain the world’s strongest military power and
has recently flexed its muscles and influence throughout the Middle East, many fear that
Iran will, as a result of decreased pressure from the international system, attempt to
balance American power in the region. As I demonstrated above, however, Tehran may
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not make the same calculation. Thus, if Iran will not attempt to balance American power
in the region with nuclear weapons, then Turkey should not fear an altered security
environment created by Iran.
The security environments of each county are drastically different. That of Iran is
characterized by mistrust of the international system, long rivalries with neighboring
states, and the world’s strongest military power surrounding it on most sides, both
directly and indirectly. Through Tehran’s quest for self-reliance and perceived need to
balance against military power, some believe it may turn to nuclear weapons in order to
fulfill this requirement. Even though the security environment is changing for both
states, it is not changing in ways that will make nuclear weapons proliferation more
likely. Iran will still likely rely on traditional military capabilities, as well as
asymmetrical capabilities. Furthermore, Turkey will likely focus its attention on other
types of issues, particularly political and economic, as it seeks to further its influence in
the region. Turkey, on the other hand, has a longstanding security assurance with the
United States through NATO as well as no direct military rival. Instead, the effects of
Iranian quests for superiority in the region are indirect consequences. For example,
Iranian quest for prestige may hinder Turkish goals of becoming a leader in the Middle
East.
Economic Interests
As the economy becomes more globalized, it will dramatically affect the
calculations and capacities of both Turkey and Iran with regards to nuclear weapons. As
mentioned above, Turkey has a strong interest to improve its economic strength, and the
pursuit of nuclear weapons would destroy this ambition. Even though the prospects for
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Turkish EU membership look grim, Ankara still has strong economic ties to Europe.
These ties will certainly be cut if any evidence of nuclear weapons research were to be
discovered in Turkey. But this may not even be an issue should Turkish leadership
remain persistent in their efforts to join the EU. Also, as the economy becomes more and
more globalized, Turkey is working with states that may have a detrimental impact on its
security environment, as mentioned above with respect to Iranian economic relationships.
It is clear that the economy of Turkey plays a much stronger role than security concerns,
and Turkish calculations certainly do not fit the neo-realist mold. For Turkey, the
globalizing economy is a positive incentive for Turkey to forgo nuclear considerations.
Iran, on the other hand, is more likely to be affected by disincentives caused by
the globalizing economy. As the international community attempts to stop enrichment in
Iran, sanctions are becoming more targeted and more focused. Furthermore, many
analysts hope that sanctions will eliminate Iranian capacity to fund and supply expensive
weaponization programs.
Ideational Factors
Both Turkey and Iran are looking for prestige as they pursue their goals of
becoming leaders in the Middle East. For Turkey, this means becoming an example of a
secular and democratic government can work in the Islamic world. For Iran, this means
increasing its influence in the region and becoming more like the great Persian Empire of
the past.
Furthermore, governmental characteristics will certainly play a large role in the
nuclear calculations and decisions of both states. For Turkey, as an open and democratic
society, any decision about nuclear weapons will be much more difficult to pass. This is
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exacerbated by the strong environmentalist voices in Turkish politics that will likely not
approve of nuclear plants or research facilities needed for nuclear weapons programs.
For Iran, the differences between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad (and
perhaps future presidents), as well as other factions within the Iranian government, will
make the coordination of large-scale projects more difficult.
Finally, norms play a role in both Turkey and Iran, albeit to very different
degrees. In Turkey, the strong adherence to norms is genuine. They are in good standing
with every WMD treaty, and seek legitimacy within the international community. Iran,
on the other hand, does not have nearly as good of a record when it comes to WMD
norms. The fact that Tehran has attempt to defy the IAEA and the international
community time and time again with its uranium enrichment projects is strong evidence
that Iran is not concerned with norms; however, as demonstrated above, norms still play a
role, albeit to a much smaller degree than in Turkey. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei
has proclaimed time and time again that nuclear weapons are against Islamic principles.
This is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that norms are a strong enough force to
keep Tehran from weapons, but it demonstrates that norms exist to some capacity, and
these are not likely to be changed by the emerging international system.
Capacity
Both countries seem to have the capacity, albeit, to different degrees, to obtain a
nuclear capability. Turkey has the nuclear know-how, or at least the ability to gain it,
with regard to nuclear energy (although perhaps not with regard to the tacit knowledge
required to build a weapon). Furthermore, it likely has the economic capacity to pursue
expensive nuclear enrichment and weaponization programs if it so chooses; however, it is
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not likely that Turkish officials will conclude that nuclear programs will be worth the
money, and choose to focus on investing in other areas. Furthermore, Ankara’s economic
capacity to produce nuclear weapons would significantly decline if they chose to pursue
them due to the inevitable alienation by the international community.
Iran, on the other hand, is much more likely to obtain the ability to produce
nuclear weapons in the future due in large part to two things: it’s current advances in
nuclear enrichment research and its economic capacity as a result of its large oil supplies.
Furthermore, Iran has received vital assistance in the past.
Concluding Remarks
The research and analysis presented here demonstrate a different future than is
traditionally expected with multipolar systems. I have demonstrated many theories and
hypotheses that do not align with traditional neorealist theories of multipolar systems.
The emerging system will not be characterized by material rivalry, but by economic
rivalry and interdependence. Furthermore, norms and regimes will mitigate power
struggles that may occur. Even though nuclear proliferation is not a problem that is going
to go away, the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons in the emerging multipolar
international system is not as horrific as many analysts and commentators make it out to
be.
In the emerging system, ideational factors will play a stronger role in pushing a
state to pursue nuclear weapons than material factors. Ideational and material factors,
however, cannot be separated. Whereas these factors may be separated analytically,
empirically, they are deeply connected and intertwined. Although capacity and economic
interests will be pushing states away from nuclearization, ultimately, they way in which
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state leadership, influenced by their norms, ideas, and the understandings they have of
their interests, will be the deciding factor.
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